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ABSTRACT—According to standard lore, when jurors are doused with “a 
kettleful of law” at the end of a trial, they either ignore it or are hopelessly 
confused. We present new evidence from a unique data set: not mock jury 
experiments or post-trial self-reports, but rather the deliberations of fifty 
real civil juries. Our intensive analysis of these deliberations presents a 
picture that contradicts received wisdom about juries and the law. We show 
that juries in typical civil cases pay substantial attention to the instructions 
and that although they struggle, the juries develop a reasonable grasp of 
most of the law they are asked to apply. When instructions fail, they do so 
primarily in ways that are generally ignored in the debate about juries and 
the law. That is, the jury deliberations reveal that when communication 
breaks down, the breakdown stems from more fundamental sources than 
simply opaque legal language. We identify a few modest pockets of juror 
resistance to the law and suggest why jury commonsense may in some 
instances be preferable to announced legal standards. We conclude that it 
will take more than a “plain English” movement to achieve genuine 
harmony between laypersons and jury instructions on the law. 
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I. JURIES AND THE LAW 
The standard story told about juries and the law is that the legal 
instructions jurors receive at the end of the trial are little more than window 
dressing—either the jurors simply ignore the instructions or they are 
hopelessly confused by the legal guidance the instructions purport to give.1 
After all, if law students struggle mightily to learn how to think like lawyers 
and attorneys spend a lifetime in practice arguing about how the law should 
be interpreted, how can anyone expect to convey complex legal principles 
to a lay audience with an abbreviated presentation at the end of a trial? The 
classic image is of the jury “being doused with a kettleful of law during the 
charge that would make a third-year law student blanch.”2 Yet jury trials 
proceed on the implicit assumption that jurors learn the relevant law from 
 
1  E.g., JEFFREY ABRAMSON, WE, THE JURY 91 (1994); Michael J. Saks, Judicial Nullification, 
68 IND. L.J. 1281, 1295 (1993). 
2  Skidmore v. Balt. & Ohio R.R., 167 F.2d 54, 64 (2d Cir. 1948) (quoting CURTIS BOK, I TOO, 
NICODEMUS 261–62 (1946)) (internal quotation mark omitted). 
106:1537 (2012) “Kettleful of Law” 
 1539
jury instructions.3 Appellate courts follow suit, regularly engaging in a 
careful parsing of the specific language used in the instructions the jury has 
been given, assuming, or at least behaving as if they assume, that a legally 
correct instruction was necessary and sufficient to guide the jury in 
producing an acceptable verdict.4 This account of court behavior suggests a 
serious commitment to having jurors apply the law. 
An alternative view of jury instructions is that the legal system is 
ambivalent or even opposed to interfering with juries as they apply their 
laypersons’ sense of justice.5 Indeed, as we describe in detail below, some 
of the methods and procedures used in drafting and delivering jury 
instructions suggest at least a softness in the commitment to instructing 
juries on the relevant law. 
Mock jury studies and post-trial surveys have long suggested 
substantial failures in the instruction process, but they have spurred little 
action.6 Until now, however, we have had no direct evidence on what real 
juries actually do with the law during their deliberations. The new empirical 
research we present here fills this gap and provides a very different image 
of juries grappling with the law than the one elicited by mock jury studies 
and post-trial surveys. For the first time, the current research provides a 
detailed analysis of how jurors discuss the law as they reach their verdicts. 
The picture that emerges from the deliberations of fifty real civil juries 
reveals that jury instructions both succeed and fail in unexpected ways. The 
results suggest that legal jargon is not the primary culprit that threatens 
juror comprehension and application of the relevant law. Drawing on this 
new evidence, we identify the previously unacknowledged sources that 
pose obstacles to the jury’s understanding and application of the law and 
suggest approaches to respond to them. 
We begin Part II with a brief history of the development of jury 
instructions and a review of the empirical work assessing comprehension of 
instructions by the modern American jury. In Part III, we describe the 
Arizona Jury Project, which enabled us to examine how fifty deliberating 
juries in civil trials actually dealt with jury instructions, providing direct 
and unique empirical evidence on juror talk about the law during 
deliberations. In Part IV, we examine the extent and nature of deliberation 
 
3  See, e.g., Brooke Grp. Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209, 243 (1993) 
(“[A] reasonable jury is presumed to know and understand the law . . . .”); Parker v. Randolph, 442 U.S. 
62, 73 (1979) (plurality opinion) (“A crucial assumption underlying th[e] system [of trial by jury] is that 
juries will follow the instructions given them by the trial judge.”); Gacy v. Welborn, 994 F.2d 305, 313 
(7th Cir. 1993) (“[C]ourts invoke a ‘presumption’ that jurors understand and follow their instructions.”). 
4  See, e.g., California v. Brown, 479 U.S. 538, 542 (1987) (“We think a reasonable juror 
would . . . understand the instruction not to rely on ‘mere sympathy’ as a directive to ignore only the sort 
of sympathy that would be totally divorced from the evidence adduced during the penalty phase.”). 
5  Saks, supra note 1, at 1289–94. 
6  Phoebe C. Ellsworth & Alan Reifman, Juror Comprehension and Public Policy: Perceived 
Problems and Proposed Solutions, 6 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 788, 788 (2000). 
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talk about jury instructions and assess how accurately that discussion 
reflects the legal principles that the jury should apply. While we find 
important pockets of misunderstanding, this evidence suggests that 
deliberating juries do not exhibit the abysmal failure in understanding the 
law that standard comprehension tests show, and that when jurors fail to 
apply the law they are given, the slippage is not attributable primarily to 
legal jargon. In Part V, we consider how the identified sources of juror 
confusion can be addressed by adopting a more holistic (as opposed to 
piecemeal) approach to instructing jurors, and by using a more transparent 
and collaborative method of communicating with the jurors about the law. 
We also identify some deeper problems that clear and comprehensible 
instructions probably cannot solve. Finally, in Part VI, we conclude by 
comparing the inconsistencies between our picture of how juries respond to 
legal instructions and the conventional wisdom as to how juries respond. 
We also offer a more radical approach to instructing juries that would 
disclose and remedy the lion’s share of most miscommunication with the 
jury about the law. 
II. THE DEVELOPMENT OF JURY INSTRUCTIONS 
The earliest juries at common law were regarded as equal to the judge 
in their ability to interpret the law.7 The rationale was that juries not only 
had personal knowledge of the facts but also shared the values of society 
and knew the rules of ordinary transactions on which the common law was 
built.8 Judges in at least some of the American colonies recognized the right 
of the criminal jury to decide matters of law.9 Moreover, judges in early 
American courts were often untrained in the law, so they were ill-suited to 
offer legal instruction.10 In a study of seventeenth-century civil cases in 
Connecticut, historian Bruce Mann found “no indication that judges 
 
7  Harvey S. Perlman, Pattern Jury Instructions: The Application of Social Science Research, 
65 NEB. L. REV. 520, 527 (1986); see Arie M. Rubenstein, Verdicts of Consciousness: Nullification and 
the Modern Jury Trial, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 959, 959‒60 (2006) (“In the eighteenth century, it was 
commonly accepted that a defendant had the right to a jury which both found facts and determined 
whether the law should apply. However, by the end of the nineteenth century the jury was reduced to 
only a factfinding role . . . .”); see also Mark DeWolfe Howe, Juries as Judges of Criminal Law, 
52 HARV. L. REV. 582 (1939) (describing the jury’s acknowledged right to determine both fact and law 
in criminal cases in early America and the gradual erosion of that authority). 
8  This early view is reflected in the writing of John Adams: “‘The general Rules of Law and 
common Regulations of Society, under which ordinary Transactions arrange[d] themselves, . . . [were] 
well enough known to ordinary jurors’ . . . .” WILLIAM E. NELSON, AMERICANIZATION OF THE COMMON 
LAW: THE IMPACT OF LEGAL CHANGE ON MASSACHUSETTS SOCIETY, 1760–1830, at 26 (1994) (quoting 
1 LEGAL PAPERS OF JOHN ADAMS 230 (L. Kinvin Wroth & Hiller B. Zobel eds., 1965)). 
9  Stanton D. Krauss, An Inquiry into the Right of Criminal Juries to Determine the Law in Colonial 
America, 89 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 111, 121–22 (1998). 
10  JOHN H. LANGBEIN ET AL., HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW: THE DEVELOPMENT OF ANGLO-
AMERICAN LEGAL INSTITUTIONS 479 (2009). 
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instructed juries on the law to apply.”11 With the development of the 
common law and the increased professionalization of the judiciary, legal 
instructions from the judge came to play an increasing role as an instrument 
of jury control.12 By the end of the nineteenth century, as part of the 
increasing efforts at jury control, state legislatures and courts began to 
require the trial judge to instruct the jury and empowered the judge to grant 
a new trial when the jury’s verdict was held to be inconsistent with the 
law.13 In 1895, the U.S. Supreme Court held in Sparf & Hansen v. United 
States14 that jurors did not have the right to decide questions of law, even in 
criminal cases. This decision solidified the importance of jury instructions, 
for if jurors did not have the right to decide legal issues, the trial judge had 
to give the jury instructions so that the jurors could apply the appropriate 
law to the facts they found. 
Appellate courts began to review jury instructions, reversing jury 
decisions and ordering new trials when judges failed to state the applicable 
law accurately.15 Both to increase the likelihood that their instructions 
would be accurate and to decrease their chance of being reversed, judges 
formed committees, usually with representatives from the practicing bar, to 
draft pattern jury instructions that could be endorsed for use in all 
applicable cases.16 Most jurisdictions now have some form of pattern jury 
instructions,17 and in some states, judges are required to give the pattern jury 
instruction whenever applicable instructions are available.18 
 
11  BRUCE H. MANN, NEIGHBORS AND STRANGERS: LAW AND COMMUNITY IN EARLY CONNECTICUT 
74 (1987). But see William E. Nelson, The Eighteenth-Century Background of John Marshall’s 
Constitutional Jurisprudence, 76 MICH. L. REV. 893, 911–12 (1978) (describing the practice in 
Pennsylvania and other states in which judges, albeit sometimes confusingly, charged juries with the law 
to be applied). 
12  John H. Langbein, Chancellor Kent and the History of Legal Literature, 93 COLUM. L. REV. 547, 
566–67 & n.99 (1993). 
13  Renée B. Lettow, New Trial for Verdict Against Law: Judge-Jury Relations in Early Nineteenth-
Century America, 71 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 505, 521‒26 (1996). 
14  156 U.S. 51, 102 (1895). 
15  Cf. Bihn v. United States, 328 U.S. 633, 638 (1946) (finding grounds for reversal when the jury 
may have been influenced by an incorrect charge); Eller v. Koehler, 67 N.E. 89, 90 (Ohio 1903) 
(holding that incorrect instructions as to the amount of interference plaintiff must show to prove 
nuisance constituted reversible error). 
16  The first set of pattern jury instructions was developed by a committee of California judges and 
lawyers and was published in 1938. See ROBERT G. NIELAND, PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS: A 
CRITICAL LOOK AT A MODERN MOVEMENT TO IMPROVE THE JURY SYSTEM 7 (1979). 
17  Id. at 12. Westlaw has thirty-one states in its directory of pattern jury instructions. See Westlaw 
Database Directory, WESTLAW, http://directory.westlaw.com/default.asp?GUID=WDIR00000000000 
000000000099223547&RS=W&VR=2.0 (last visited March 21, 2012) (listing thirty-one states); see 
also Jan Bissett & Margi Heinen, Reference from Coast to Coast: Jury Instructions Update, LLRX.COM 
(July 27, 2007), http://www.llrx.com/columns/reference53.htm (listing six additional states with pattern 
jury instructions available on the web); Federal Jury Instructions Resource Page, FED. EVIDENCE REV., 
http://federalevidence.com/evidence-resources/federal-jury-instructions (last visited March 21, 2012) 
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As the legal system came to depend on pattern jury instructions to 
provide a reference point for trial judges and attorneys, researchers raised 
questions about the effectiveness of these instructions in providing adequate 
guidance. Since the early 1980s, scholars have accumulated evidence 
documenting the failures of jury instructions, demonstrating that laypersons 
provided with such instructions perform poorly on comprehension tests, 
both in laboratory experiments19 and on post-trial questionnaires 
administered to real jurors following their jury service,20 and in a few cases, 
revealing inaccurate comprehension of relevant legal concepts despite 
jurors’ participation in simulated deliberations.21 
 
(providing hyperlinks to the pattern jury instructions for all federal circuits except the Second and 
Fourth Circuits). 
18  E.g., ILL. SUPREME COURT COMM. ON JURY INSTRUCTIONS IN CIVIL CASES, ILLINOIS PATTERN 
JURY INSTRUCTIONS: CIVIL, intro. at 1 (2011) (quoting Illinois Supreme Court Rule 239, which 
provides: “(a) Use of IPI Instructions; Requirements of Other Instructions. Whenever Illinois Pattern 
Jury Instructions (IPI) contains an instruction applicable in a civil case, giving due consideration to the 
facts and the prevailing law, and the court determines that the jury should be instructed on the subject, 
the IPI instruction shall be used, unless the court determines that it does not accurately state the law.”). 
19  See, e.g., Robert P. Charrow & Veda R. Charrow, Making Legal Language Understandable: A 
Psycholinguistic Study of Jury Instructions, 79 COLUM. L. REV. 1306, 1316 (1979) (finding that jurors 
paraphrasing essential terms in instructions had an accuracy rate of 54%); Amiram Elwork et al., 
Toward Understandable Jury Instructions, 65 JUDICATURE 432, 436 (1982) (finding that accuracy was 
51% for a more complex case and 65% for a less complex case); Mona Lynch & Craig Haney, 
Discrimination and Instructional Comprehension: Guided Discretion, Racial Bias, and the Death 
Penalty, 24 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 337, 347 (2000) (finding that accuracy was 47% for mock jurors in a 
capital case); Laurence J. Severance & Elizabeth F. Loftus, Improving the Ability of Jurors to 
Comprehend and Apply Criminal Jury Instructions, 17 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 153, 179–80 (1982) (finding 
that overall accuracy ranged from approximately 30% to 36% across experimental conditions); Walter 
W. Steele, Jr. & Elizabeth G. Thornburg, Jury Instructions: A Persistent Failure to Communicate, 
67 N.C. L. REV. 77, 78 (1988) (“[J]urors understood less than half the content of the tested 
instructions . . . .”); Richard L. Wiener et al., Comprehensibility of Approved Jury Instructions in 
Capital Murder Cases, 80 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 455, 462 (1995) (finding that the upper bound of mock 
jurors’ accuracy for key concepts in capital case instructions was rarely above 70%); see also Joel D. 
Lieberman & Bruce D. Sales, What Social Science Teaches Us About the Jury Instruction Process, 
3 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 589 (1997) (reviewing empirical studies of the effectiveness of 
instructions). 
20  See, e.g., Alan Reifman et al., Real Jurors’ Understanding of the Law in Real Cases, 16 LAW & 
HUM. BEHAV. 539, 548 (1992) (finding that jurors responding to a post-trial survey rarely showed 
higher rates of accuracy on legal issues on which they had been instructed than jurors who had not been 
instructed on those issues); Bradley Saxton, How Well Do Jurors Understand Jury Instructions? A Field 
Test Using Real Juries and Real Trials in Wyoming, 33 LAND & WATER L. REV. 59, 88 (1998) (finding 
that former civil jurors responding to a post-trial questionnaire on instruction comprehension had 
accuracy rates of 58%). 
21  See, e.g., Mona Lynch & Craig Haney, Capital Jury Deliberation: Effects on Death Sentencing, 
Comprehension, and Discrimination, 33 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 481, 486–87 (2009) (finding that mock 
jurors had scores of less than 50% correct on a post-deliberation test of instruction comprehension); 
Richard L. Wiener et al., Guided Jury Discretion in Capital Murder Cases: The Role of Declarative and 
Procedural Knowledge, 10 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 516, 555 (2004) (showing essentially no effect 
for deliberation in improving juror comprehension scores on tests of instructions); see also Phoebe C. 
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Yet this image of jurors befuddled by the law they are asked to apply is 
not in complete harmony with some other sources of evidence. First, when 
asked, the majority of jurors questioned in post-trial surveys report that they 
did not find their legal instructions difficult to understand22 (although some 
report they are less convinced that other members of their jury similarly 
grasped the relevant law23). Of course, these positive juror reports may well 
be wrong, reflecting an overoptimistic self-evaluation. A potentially more 
significant indicator is that nearly all studies that have compared jury 
verdicts with the verdicts that judges report they would have reached in the 
same trial find substantial agreement between the two decisionmakers.24 
This agreement certainly could arise not because jurors understand the legal 
instructions, but because they share values consistent with the content of 
those instructions. Whatever the source of the agreement, it does provide an 
indication that problems in communicating legal principles may not pose a 
significant threat to the quality of most jury decisionmaking. It is also 
possible, as Professor Michael Saks suggests, that judges may produce jury 
agreement by influencing juries to agree with them through nonverbal cues 
that are likely to be most influential when the evidence and law are not 
clear.25 Without a close look at how juries use (or fail to use) legal 
instructions during their deliberations, it is hard to evaluate the extent to 
which jury misunderstandings about the law play a role in the 
decisionmaking process or in final verdicts. 
Nonetheless, there is no doubt that jury instructions are hardly the 
model of clear communication. Pattern jury instructions are typically 
 
Ellsworth, Are Twelve Heads Better than One?, 52 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 205, 219 (1989) (finding 
that 51% of references to instructions during deliberation were correct statements). 
22  See, e.g., SEVENTH CIRCUIT BAR ASS’N AM. JURY PROJECT COMM’N, FINAL REPORT 50 (2008), 
available at http://www.7thcircuitbar.org/associations/1507/files/7th%20Circuit%20American%20Jury
%20Project%20Final%20Report.pdf; Dennis J. Devine et al., Deliberation Quality: A Preliminary 
Examination in Criminal Juries, 4 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 273, 285 (2007) (reporting that 84% of 
jurors responded that the law to be applied was clear and understandable after instructions). 
23  Shari Seidman Diamond, What Jurors Think: Expectations and Reactions of Citizens Who Serve 
as Jurors, in VERDICT: ASSESSING THE CIVIL JURY SYSTEM 282, 282–305 (Robert E. Litan ed., 1993). 
24  HARRY KALVEN, JR. & HANS ZEISEL, THE AMERICAN JURY 58–68 (1966) (78% agreement in 
3576 criminal trials and 78% agreement in approximately 4000 civil trials, with hung juries treated as 
half agreement, half disagreement); see also Shari Seidman Diamond, Truth, Justice, and the Jury, 
26 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 143, 150 n.28 (2003) (finding 77% agreement in forty-six civil trials and 
74% agreement in forty trials in which liability was contested (citing Shari Seidman Diamond et al., 
Juror Discussions During Civil Trials: Studying an Arizona Innovation, 45 ARIZ. L. REV. 1 (2003))); 
Theodore Eisenberg et al., Judge-Jury Agreement in Criminal Cases: A Partial Replication of Kalven 
and Zeisel’s The American Jury, 2 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 171, 181 (2005) (finding 75% agreement 
in 290 criminal trials); Larry Heuer & Steven Penrod, Trial Complexity: A Field Investigation of Its 
Meaning and Its Effects, 18 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 29, 48 (1994) (finding 74% agreement in seventy-
seven criminal trials and 63% agreement in sixty-seven civil trials). For a review, see Jennifer K. 
Robbennolt, Evaluating Juries by Comparison to Judges: A Benchmark for Judging?, 32 FLA. ST. U. L. 
REV. 469 (2005). 
25  Saks, supra note 1, at 1290. 
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written by committees of judges and attorneys who represent opposing 
parties (i.e., prosecutors and defense attorneys in criminal cases and 
plaintiff and defense attorneys in civil cases). The legal expertise of these 
groups appropriately prepares them to produce pattern instructions that can 
save the time of lawyers and judges during trial. It also reduces the 
likelihood of an appeal or reversal due to an erroneous instruction. Yet legal 
accuracy and vetting by multiple legal constituencies do not guarantee that 
the instructions will be comprehensible to laypersons. Even achieving legal 
accuracy can be a challenge when the law itself is ambiguous. Committees 
writing pattern jury instructions have traditionally turned to the wording of 
statutes and to case law to decide on the wording of instructions, but have 
given little or no attention to communicating meanings to nonlawyers. The 
results include instructions like those once given to Illinois juries deciding 
on whether or not to impose the death penalty: “If you do not unanimously 
find from your consideration of all the evidence that there are no mitigating 
factors sufficient to preclude imposition of a death sentence, then you 
should sign the verdict requiring the court to impose a sentence other than 
death.”26 Although that example includes relatively few words that would 
be unfamiliar to laypersons,27 the sentence construction—with its four 
negatives—fails to provide a clear description of the weighing standard that 
laypersons should apply and displays the tortured construction that can 
result when a committee is the author of a communication.28 
Recent reform efforts, such as providing preliminary instructions and 
supplying jurors with written copies of the instructions, are designed to 
assist the jury in understanding and applying the law.29 Although it might 
fairly be argued that these reforms are obvious improvements that are long 
 
26  Gacy v. Welborn, 994 F.2d 305, 314 (7th Cir. 1993) (quoting 1987 Illinois Pattern Jury 
Instructions). 
27  Nonetheless, some informal testing that linguist Judith Levi did with college students suggested 
that the word “preclude” is not unambiguous: many of the students thought it meant the opposite of 
“conclude.” Judith N. Levi, Evaluating Jury Comprehension of Illinois Capital-Sentencing Instructions, 
68 AM. SPEECH 20, 28–29 (1993). 
28  This convoluted language was later revised to read: “If after weighing the factors in aggravation 
and mitigation one or more jurors determine that death is not the appropriate sentence, then you should 
sign the verdict requiring the court to impose a sentence [(other than death) (of natural life 
imprisonment)].” 1 ILL. SUPREME COURT COMM. ON PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS IN CRIMINAL 
CASES, ILLINOIS PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS—CRIMINAL § 7C.06A (4th ed. 2000 & Supp. 2011) (to 
be used in all cases for offenses committed on or after November 13, 2003). It is unclear the extent to 
which the revised language produced clarity, but the instruction is now moot in light of the 2011 
decision to abolish the death penalty in Illinois. 
29  See B. Michael Dann & George Logan III, Jury Reform: The Arizona Experience, 
79 JUDICATURE 280, 281–82 (1996); Leonard B. Sand & Steven Alan Reiss, A Report on Seven 
Experiments Conducted by District Court Judges in the Second Circuit, 60 N.Y.U. L. REV. 423, 437–42 
(1985); William W. Schwarzer, Reforming Jury Trials, 1990 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 119, 129–31; see also 
AM. BAR ASS’N, PRINCIPLES FOR JURIES AND JURY TRIALS princ. 6.C.1, at 29 (2005) (endorsing 
preliminary instructions, and 14.B, advocating written copies of instructions for each juror). 
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overdue, the ability of these aids to offer significant assistance may be 
limited unless the instructions themselves are comprehensible.30 As the legal 
community has acknowledged, current jury instructions frequently fail to 
achieve clarity. Indeed, Principle 14.A of the 2005 American Bar 
Association’s Principles for Juries and Jury Trials addresses this issue 
explicitly by providing: “All instructions to the jury should be in plain and 
understandable language.”31 The commentary recognizes that “jury 
instructions remain syntactically convoluted, overly formal and abstract, 
and full of legalese” and suggests that communication with the jury often 
suffers as a result.32 Nonetheless, despite the fact that sporadic efforts to 
improve the comprehensibility of instructions show that substantial 
improvements can be made,33 only one jurisdiction has taken on the task of 
substantially rewriting its pattern jury instructions in “plain English.”34 
The research we present here on real jury deliberations suggests that 
the problem of miscommunication may be both overstated and 
mischaracterized. That is not to say that jury instructions always provide 
clear guidance. Frequently, they do not. In addition, jurors sometimes resist 
following legal instructions that they understand. As a whole, however, 
communication and jury compliance with the law may be far better than 
common wisdom or experimental studies suggest. Moreover, the problems 
that do arise often emerge from weaknesses not previously identified: 
structural problems and omissions. In some instances, addressing them 
would require the legal system to confront questions about the legitimacy of 
juror considerations that are inconsistent with legal doctrine and legal 
doctrines that are themselves opaque or reflect ambivalent preferences for 
how jurors should behave. This new information presents a significant set 
of previously unconsidered challenges. Remedies require more dramatic 
 
30  Even these reforms have not been uniformly embraced. For example, the National Center for 
State Courts (NCSC) State-of-the-States Survey found that in nearly one out of three jury trials that took 
place in the previous year in state courts, the jury did not receive a written copy of the instructions (and 
in one of every five federal jury trials, no copy was provided). GREGORY E. MIZE ET AL., THE STATE-
OF-THE-STATES SURVEY OF JURY IMPROVEMENT EFFORTS: A COMPENDIUM REPORT 32 tbl.24 (2007). 
31  AM. BAR ASS’N, supra note 29, at princ. 14.A, at 107. 
32  Id. at princ. 14.A cmt. subdiv. A, at 108. 
33  See, e.g., AMIRAM ELWORK ET AL., MAKING JURY INSTRUCTIONS UNDERSTANDABLE 45–49 
(1982); Shari Seidman Diamond & Judith N. Levi, Improving Decisions on Death by Revising and 
Testing Jury Instructions, 79 JUDICATURE 224, 232 (1996); James Luginbuhl, Comprehension of 
Judges’ Instructions in the Penalty Phase of a Capital Trial: Focus on Mitigating Circumstances, 
16 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 203, 210–17 (1992) (finding that revising North Carolina’s pattern jury 
instructions could substantially improve jury comprehension). 
34  California included linguist Peter Tiersma on the pattern jury instructions committee. For 
Tiersma’s review of the committee’s approach, the problems it sought to address, and its solutions, see 
Peter Tiersma, The Rocky Road to Legal Reform: Improving the Language of Jury Instructions, 
66 BROOK. L. REV. 1081 (2001). 
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changes than simply reducing the use of legal jargon and tinkering with 
awkward sentence construction.35 
Courts focusing on simple linguistic translation as the big obstacle to 
juror comprehension have tended to resist making changes to the magic 
language of statutes and tradition.36 Thus, courts typically respond to 
questions from the jury about instructions either by simply rereading the 
original language or by telling the jury to look again at the instructions to 
determine the relevant law.37 Such passive responses can only be justified if 
the court is convinced that clear communication is not possible. Moreover, 
“doing no harm” is the most effective way for a trial court to reduce the 
likelihood of being reversed for misstating the law.38 
As our close study of fifty deliberations reveals, the failure to actively 
address the variety of sources leading to miscomprehension of instructions 
has consequences: juries may reach decisions that are inconsistent with the 
law they are ostensibly being asked to apply. While most verdicts appeared 
to be unaffected by problems with the instructions or resistance to a 
relevant legal principle, the juries in several instances awarded damages 
that were to some degree influenced by instruction errors. Thus, although 
our results show far more appropriate application of relevant law than 
laboratory jury research would have predicted, they also reveal pockets of 
unnecessary miscommunication. 
To obtain a better picture of the interaction between juries and the law 
that is grounded in what jurors actually do, we now turn to the evidence 
from the deliberations of real juries. 
III. THE ARIZONA JURY PROJECT 
A. The Background of the Project 
The Arizona Jury Project, in which we observed actual jury 
deliberations,39 presented a unique occasion to observe how juries handle 
jury instructions. The opportunity to study these jury deliberations arose 
because an innovative group of judges and attorneys in Arizona, appointed 
 
35  We do not underestimate the challenge of writing legally accurate jury instructions that avoid 
legal jargon and convoluted sentences. One of us (S.D.), in serving on the Seventh Circuit Criminal 
Pattern Jury Instructions Committee, has been impressed by the difficulty in achieving both the accuracy 
and clarity of each instruction, despite strenuous efforts to accomplish those goals. 
36  Tiersma, supra note 34, at 1084. 
37  Ellsworth, supra note 21, at 223–24; Geoffrey P. Kramer & Dorean M. Koenig, Do Jurors 
Understand Criminal Jury Instructions? Analyzing the Results of the Michigan Juror Comprehension 
Project, 23 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 401, 403 n.14 (1990); Peter M. Tiersma, Jury Instructions in the New 
Millennium, CT. REV., Summer 1999, at 28, 31. 
38  See Darryl K. Brown, Regulating Decision Effects of Legally Sufficient Jury Instructions, 73 S. 
CAL. L. REV. 1105, 1115 (2000). 
39  See Shari Seidman Diamond et al., Juror Discussions During Civil Trials: Studying an Arizona 
Innovation, 45 ARIZ. L. REV. 1, 16–22 (2003). 
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by the Arizona Supreme Court, examined their judicial system and 
proposed changes to their rules in an attempt to optimize jury 
performance.40 One such rule was a controversial innovation permitting 
jurors to discuss the case among themselves during breaks in the trial.41 To 
evaluate the effect of allowing these discussions, the Arizona Supreme 
Court issued an order permitting us to conduct an experiment in which 
jurors in randomly assigned cases were instructed that they could discuss 
the case and those in the control cases were given the traditional admonition 
not to discuss the case.42 The court order also permitted us to videotape the 
jury discussions and deliberations.43 
B. Selection of Jurors and Cases 
The jurors, attorneys, and parties were promised that the tapes would 
be viewed only by the researchers and only for research purposes. Jurors 
were told about the videotaping project when they arrived at court for their 
jury service. If they preferred not to participate, they were assigned to cases 
not involved in the project. The juror participation rate was more than 
95%.44 Attorneys and litigants were less willing to take part in the study. 
Some attorneys were generally willing to participate when they had a case 
before one of the participating judges; others consistently refused. A case 
could be included only if all attorneys and litigants agreed. The result was a 
22% yield among otherwise eligible trials. 
The fifty cases in the study reflected the usual mix of cases dealt with 
by state courts: twenty-six motor vehicle cases (52%), four medical 
malpractice cases (8%), seventeen other tort cases (34%), and three contract 
cases (6%).45 The forty-seven tort cases in the sample varied from the 
common rear-end collision with a claim of soft-tissue injury to cases 
 
40  ARIZ. SUPREME COURT COMM. ON MORE EFFECTIVE USE OF JURIES, JURORS: THE POWER OF 12, 
at 2–3 (1994). 
41  Diamond et al., supra note 39, at 4, 11–14. 
42  Id. at 17. In preparing this Article, we tested and found no impact of the opportunity to discuss 
the evidence during breaks during the trial on talk about the law. 
43  Id. For a detailed report on the permissions and security measures that the project required and 
the results of the evaluation, see id. As part of their obligations of confidentiality under the Supreme 
Court order, as well as additional assurances to parties and jurors undertaken by the principal 
investigators, the authors of this Article have changed certain details to disguise individual cases. The 
changes do not, however, affect the substantive nature of the findings that are reported. 
44  Id. Although we cannot be certain that the cameras had no effect on their behavior during 
deliberations, the behavior during deliberations at times included comments that the jurors presumably 
would not have wanted the judges or attorneys to hear. 
45  Our case distribution is similar to the breakdown for civil jury trials for the Pima County, Arizona 
Superior Court for the year 2001: 62% motor vehicle tort cases, 8% medical malpractice cases, 23% 
other tort cases, and 6% contract cases. E-mail from Nicole L. Waters, Nat’l Ctr. for State Courts, to 
authors (Aug. 2, 2004) (on file with authors). 
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involving severe and permanent injury or death. Awards ranged from $1000 
to $2.8 million, with a median award of $25,500. 
C. Data Collection 
In addition to videotaping the discussions and deliberations, we also 
videotaped the trials themselves and collected the exhibits, juror questions 
submitted during trial, jury instructions, and verdict forms. In addition, the 
jurors, attorneys, and judge completed questionnaires at the end of the trial. 
D. The Data 
1. The Trials.—We transcribed the opening and closing arguments in 
each case from the trial videotape. We also created a detailed roadmap of 
the trial from the videotaped trial. The roadmap described the order in 
which testimony occurred, reconstructing in substantial detail what each 
witness said and indicating whether the testimony emerged on direct 
examination, cross-examination, or redirect. In addition, the roadmap 
included any objections from counsel and the outcome of those objections. 
The roadmap also included the questions that jurors submitted to the judge 
during the trial and the responses that witnesses gave to the juror questions 
that the witnesses were permitted to answer.46 
2. The Instructions.—We obtained the complete set of instructions 
that the court delivered to the jury in each trial. Each juror received a copy 
of the final instructions for use during deliberations, consistent with the 
practice in Arizona.47 The instructions averaged seventeen pages and varied 
in length between thirteen and thirty-three pages. The instructions always 
began with the same seven pages of boilerplate instructions (e.g., “What the 
attorneys said is not evidence,” “Do not concern yourselves with the 
reasons for my rulings on the admission of evidence,” “You should not 
speculate or guess about any fact.”).48 An eighth page provided an 
instruction on evaluating expert testimony and was included in forty-seven 
of the fifty cases—all of the cases in which an expert testified.49 These 
boilerplate instructions were followed by a set of case-specific instructions 
that varied across trials, depending on the nature of the claims and the 
evidence (e.g., what the plaintiff must prove, the life expectancy of 
individuals the same age as the plaintiff, the particular categories of 
 
46  Diamond et al., supra note 39, at 19. 
47  See Dann & Logan, supra note 29, at 282. 
48  Copies of the instructions are on file with the authors. 
49  At the beginning of the trial, the judge delivered a set of boilerplate instructions that were also 
included in the final instructions. The preliminary instructions also included: procedural instructions on 
note-taking; submitting questions for witnesses during trial; not doing outside research or speaking with 
parties, lawyers, or witnesses; and, for cases in which the jurors were permitted to discuss the case 
during breaks, instructions on how and when such discussions could occur. 
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damages to consider if the defendant is found liable, the directive to 
compensate only for aggravation of a preexisting condition). In addition to 
the instructions, each jury was provided with verdict forms, which provided 
supplementary information on the legal requirements of the task (e.g., in a 
comparative fault case, space on the verdict form for allocating 100% of 
liability across two parties). 
Jurors also received instructions on the law from the judge during the 
course of the trial, including during deliberations. These instructions 
occurred in response to one of two events. The first arose when the judge 
responded to a question from the jurors about the law (e.g., “Since the 
defendant has admitted negligence in causing the collisions does that mean 
we must find in favor of the plaintiff?”) or, more often, when a juror 
question asked for information about a topic the jurors were not permitted 
to consider (e.g., a question about insurance or whether one of the parties 
received a citation after the accident). The second occasion for an 
instruction given during the course of the trial arose if one of the attorneys 
raised an objection and the judge sustained it. We analyzed all juror talk 
during deliberations about instructions received either during the trial, 
including during deliberations, or in preliminary or final instructions. 
3. Data from the Deliberations.—We created verbatim transcripts of 
all deliberations, producing 5276 pages of deliberations transcripts for the 
fifty trials. The deliberations consisted of 78,864 comments by the jurors, 
each of which was coded on a variety of dimensions, including whether the 
comment involved a reference to the instructions. A comment was defined 
as a statement or partial statement that continued until the speaker stopped 
talking or until another speaker’s statement or partial statement began. If 
another speaker interrupted, but the original speaker continued talking, the 
continuation was treated as part of the initial comment. For example, here 
Juror #2 is in mid-sentence when Juror #4 interrupts to agree before Juror 
#2 completes his comment: 
JUROR #2: Negligence and cause of death . . . [are] also in the fact of what  
you don’t do— 
JUROR #4: I, I agree. 
JUROR #2: —to prevent it. 
In this instance, Juror #2 was credited with one comment and Juror #4 was 
credited with one comment. 
4. Post-Trial Questionnaires.—At the end of the trial, each juror and 
judge completed a questionnaire about the trial. One of the questions asked 
them to rate how easy or difficult it was to understand the jury instructions 
on a seven-point scale (1 = very difficult to 7 = very easy). 
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IV. ANALYSIS OF JURY TALK ABOUT THE LAW DURING DELIBERATIONS 
A. Defining Talk About the Instructions 
We coded each comment a juror made that referred to one of the 
concepts covered by the jury instructions (e.g., the applicable standard of 
care, the burden of proof, categories of potential damages). Before coding a 
case, we closely examined the instructions for that case to identify terms 
and phrases that the jurors might use if they were drawing from the 
instructions, but would be unlikely to use in the absence of the instructions. 
The specialized words and phrases in the instructions that presumptively 
triggered an instruction code varied from case to case. For example, a slip-
and-fall case included the instruction: “One of the tests used in determining 
whether a condition is unreasonably dangerous is whether it is open and 
obvious.” When jurors used the phrases “unreasonably dangerous” or “open 
and obvious” during deliberations, this triggered the presumption that the 
comment was stimulated by the instructions. Thus, when Juror #1 said, “I 
don’t feel like it’s unreasonably dangerous . . . ,” we coded the comment as 
an instruction reference. 
In talking about the instructions, jurors sometimes directly referred to 
the fact that the judge had instructed them on an issue (e.g., “The judge told 
us not to speculate.”). More often, however, the reference was indirect, 
either because the juror simply incorporated the judge’s directive (e.g., 
“We’re not supposed to speculate.”) or because the juror adopted the 
language or concept of the instruction (e.g., in a slip-and-fall case, “But did 
he actually know about the dangerous condition?”). We counted jurors’ 
references to the judicial instructions that were either literal or conceptual. 
Literal references explicitly used the language of the instructions (e.g., “We 
shouldn’t compensate for her preexisting condition.”), while conceptual 
references conveyed the same idea without using the literal language of the 
instruction (e.g., “We know that her leg hurt before the accident—we have 
to figure out how much of the expenses were due to the accident.”). 
We did not code a comment as instruction-based if a juror might have 
used the word or phrase or discussed a topic in the absence of an 
instruction. For example, when a juror said, “I don’t think it was his fault,” 
we did not code this statement as an instruction comment because a juror 
who watched the trial but never heard the judge’s instructions might easily 
have made this comment, even using the term “fault” in discussing the case. 
In contrast, if the juror said, “To find him at fault, we have to decide that his 
negligence caused the plaintiff’s injury,” the comment was treated as an 
instruction reference because we could infer that the juror was drawing on 
the instructions to produce this comment. This approach was conservative 
in counting instruction references because we did not count some law-
related comments that might very well have been stimulated by the 
instructions. 
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We also counted talk about instructions conservatively when the jurors 
discussed damages. Each set of jury instructions included a list of damage 
categories tailored to the particular case that jurors were to consider if they 
found the defendant at fault (e.g., lost wages, medical expenses). As a 
result, every mention of a damage category could be treated as a reference 
to the instructions as jurors offered their preferred awards in the case (e.g., 
“Me? I agree with what’s been said—about $1500 for lost wages.”). If we 
had considered every remark that mentioned a damage category as an 
instruction reference, we would have coded much of the damages 
discussion as talk about the instructions, which would have produced a 
highly misleading result. To avoid overcounting, we coded only the first 
instance in which any juror mentioned a damage category, for example, 
“We have to decide how much to give him for lost wages.” We did not code 
references to lost wages in the conversation that followed on that topic (i.e., 
as jurors decided how much to award for lost wages). If the jurors changed 
the topic (e.g., from lost wages to medical expenses) and a juror later 
reintroduced the earlier topic of lost wages, we coded the reintroduction as 
an instruction reference. Thus, we treated the first instances as reflecting the 
influence of the instruction—as pointing the jurors toward a topic that they 
were instructed to discuss. We considered any subsequent mention of the 
damage category within the same line of conversation as less clearly linked 
to the instructions and therefore did not code them as instruction references. 
We did, however, code as instruction references all comments that referred 
to the meaning of the category (e.g., “What do they mean by the nature, 
extent, and duration of the injury?”), including explicit errors about the 
category (e.g., if a juror said that the jury was obligated to award the full 
amount of medical expenses covered in the submitted bills, rather than what 
they determined was a reasonable amount, we coded this as an instruction 
error). This coding system produced a reliable set of coding decisions.50 
Because of our decisions to avoid treating ambiguous references to 
legal-concepts language as referring to the instructions and to code only the 
first reference to a damage category as referring to the instructions, our 
assessment of the amount of talk about instructions may somewhat 
undercount juror references to instructions. Because we did count every 
 
50  To assess the reliability of this coding, two coders independently coded each comment in five 
deliberations to determine whether or not it was an instruction reference. Coding was done using the 
index described by Charles P. Smith for analysis of qualitative text by dividing twice the number of 
agreements on a category by the sum of the frequency that each coder used the category. See Charles P. 
Smith, Content Analysis and Narrative Analysis, in HANDBOOK OF RESEARCH METHODS IN SOCIAL AND 
PERSONALITY PSYCHOLOGY 313, 313–27 (Harry T. Reis & Charles M. Judd eds., 2000). The reliability 
ranged from 0.84 to 0.96, averaging 0.89 across the five cases. In general, reliability indicators at this 
level are viewed as having “almost perfect” reliability. See J. Richard Landis & Gary G. Koch, The 
Measurement of Observer Agreement for Categorical Data, 33 BIOMETRICS 159, 165 (1977) 
(characterizing the strength of different agreement values). 
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error whenever it occurred,51 the rate of errors as a proportion of this 
conservative measure of talk about instructions provides a generous 
assessment of the error rate. Despite this approach, the results show that the 
accuracy of juror talk about the instructions was unexpectedly high in light 
of the previous evidence on juror comprehension of instructions.52 
B. An Overview of Talk About the Law 
1. How Much Do Jurors Talk About the Law?.—Across the fifty 
cases, the jurors made 13,519 comments about the law, constituting 17.1% 
of all comments made during deliberations.53 The jurors thus focused 
significant attention on the legal guidance they received from the 
instructions, providing convincing evidence that jurors do not simply ignore 
jury instructions.54 
Another indicator of the attention jurors paid to the instructions is how 
quickly instructions entered deliberations as a topic for consideration. We 
excluded foreperson selection, which typically occurs at the very beginning 
of deliberations in response to the final instructions that jurors receive,55 as 
well as any preliminary procedural comments based on the instructions 
(e.g., “We don’t all have to agree to reach a verdict.”). Even with these 
exclusions, the first exchange on the substance of the applicable law (i.e., at 
least two jurors exchanging substantive legal comments) occurred early in 
the deliberations on most juries: on thirty-eight of the fifty juries (76%) it 
occurred during the first ten minutes. A majority (twenty-six) of the juries 
exchanged comments about the substantive instructions during the first five 
minutes of deliberations, and another twelve had some exchange during the 
first ten minutes. 
 
51  See infra note 64 for an explanation. 
52  See infra Part IV.B.4. 
53  The range was between 3.5% and 38.2% per case. Because the deliberations varied in length, the 
average percent per case differed slightly from the percent of total comments across cases (16.5% per 
case versus 17.1% across all cases). 
54  See also REID HASTIE ET AL., INSIDE THE JURY 85 (1983) (describing a jury simulation involving 
a criminal case in which nearly a quarter of the juror comments related to the instructions). Our lower 
rate may reflect differences between criminal and civil cases or between real and simulated juries, but it 
may also be due to our more conservative approach to attributing juror comments to the influence of 
instructions. In contrast, Hastie and his colleagues coded any discussion of determining whether or not 
to believe a witness as an instruction reference whether or not the juror mentioned the instruction on 
how to judge witness credibility. See Coding Instructions for Reid Hastie Study (on file with authors). 
On the ground that individuals naturally, even in the absence of instructions, would attempt to figure out 
who was telling the truth when confronted with competing accounts in a trial, we took the more 
conservative approach of coding those comments as instruction references only when they referred to 
the instruction or the specific criteria it included. 
55  CIVIL JURY INSTRUCTIONS COMM., STATE BAR OF ARIZ., REVISED ARIZONA JURY INSTRUCTIONS 
(CIVIL) Standard 15, at 30 (3d ed. 1997) [hereinafter RAJI (CIVIL) 3d] (“The case is now submitted to 
you for decision. When you go to the jury room you will choose a foreman. He or she will preside over 
your deliberations.”). 
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This active use of the instructions by the juries also included reading 
portions of the instructions aloud during deliberations. On forty-six of the 
fifty juries (92%), at least one juror read an instruction aloud to the group, 
and in nearly half of the trials (46%), at least half of the jurors each read at 
least one instruction aloud. Thus, at least in a jurisdiction like Arizona, 
where each juror receives a copy of the instructions, the availability of the 
document as a reference makes it possible for jurors to consult it—and they 
do. Note that although the national trend appears to favor giving juries at 
least one copy of the jury instructions,56 only a minority of courts currently 
supply all jurors with their own copies.57 
Finally, we recognized that jurors might discuss instructions with some 
frequency but focus on only a few of them, ignoring the bulk of the topics 
that the instructions cover. To assess juror coverage of the instructions, we 
analyzed how many of the legally relevant case-specific topics covered in 
the instructions were referred to by jurors during deliberations. For 
example, in a case involving a simple auto accident in which liability is 
contested and the plaintiff is claiming permanent injury, case-specific topics 
covered by the instructions would include: (1) the claim; (2) the 
requirement to show negligence, causation, and damages; (3) the burden of 
proof; (4) the damages that can be considered; and (5) the average life 
expectancy for a person the plaintiff’s age. If the defendant was alleging 
that the plaintiff had a preexisting injury, the instructions would also 
include an instruction telling the jury that if it awarded damages, those 
damages should assess the degree to which any preexisting condition had 
been made worse by the defendant’s fault.58 Similarly, if the accident 
involved allegations of comparative fault, the jury would also be instructed 
on the allocation of percentage of fault.59 
We identified 381 case-specific (i.e., non-boilerplate) instruction topics 
across the fifty cases, an average of 7.6 per case, and analyzed whether each 
instruction topic was mentioned at least once during deliberations. In the 
course of a jury’s deliberations, some instructions became irrelevant. For 
 
56  MIZE ET AL., supra note 30, at 31–32 & tbl.24 (state courts: 68.5%; federal courts: 79.4%). 
57  Id. (state courts: 32.6%; federal court: 39.0%). 
58  Jurors received the following instruction in sixteen cases, and in one additional case, the second 
paragraph was given: 
 Plaintiff is not entitled to compensation for any physical or emotional condition that pre-
existed the fault of defendant. However, if plaintiff had any pre-existing physical or emotional 
condition that was aggravated or made worse by defendant’s fault, you must decide the full 
amount of money that will reasonably and fairly compensate plaintiff for that aggravation or 
worsening. 
 You must decide the full amount of money that will reasonably and fairly compensate plaintiff 
for all damages caused by the fault of defendant, even if plaintiff was more susceptible to injury 
than a normally healthy person would have been, and even if a normally healthy person would not 
have suffered similar injury. 
RAJI (CIVIL) 3d, supra note 55, Personal Injury Damages 2, at 113. 
59  See id. at 40. Jurors were instructed on comparative fault in fourteen cases. 
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example, if a jury decided that the defendant was not negligent and 
therefore not at fault, the instructions on damages became irrelevant. If a 
jury decided that the defendant was at fault but the plaintiff had no 
permanent injury, the instruction on life expectancy became irrelevant.60 Of 
the 381 case-specific instruction topics, 22 were legally irrelevant in light of 
the particular jury’s decisions on other issues. The juries specifically talked 
about 269 of the 359 remaining topics, or 74.9% of the relevant case-
specific instruction topics, during their deliberations. The analysis of 
coverage thus indicates that the jurors were generally attentive to the 
instructions. In a few instances, however, the jurors did fail to turn to the 
instructions for guidance and that failure may have contributed to juror 
confusion on the relevant law. 
2. Predicting the Amount of Talk.—We might expect that longer 
trials or, more specifically, lengthier jury instructions, would require jurors 
to spend more time focusing on the jury instructions. It appears, however, 
that jurors allocate their deliberation time to instructions based on less 
obvious criteria. In each case, we asked the judge to rate how easy or 
difficult it was to understand the jury instructions in the case on a one to 
seven scale (1 = very difficult to 7 = very easy). The judicial rating of the 
difficulty of the instructions was a significant predictor of the percentage of 
time jurors devoted to the judicial instructions during their deliberations 
(r = -0.31, p < 0.03).61 Neither the length of the trial (r = 0.12, p > 0.40) nor 
the number of pages of instructions (r = 0.13, p > 0.30) was a significant 
predictor of the time jurors spent on instructions. In a multivariate analysis 
that included all three potential predictors, judicial rating of instruction 
difficulty remained the only significant predictor (R2 = 0.10, p < 0.03).62 
3. The Instructions that Juries Talk About.—As noted above, all 
juries received three kinds of instructions. First, every jury received the 
boilerplate preliminary and final instructions describing general rules 
applicable to all cases. Second, each jury also received case-specific 
instructions that varied across cases and included final instructions as well 
as judicial rulings on objections during trial and judicial responses to jury 
questions submitted on a legal issue during trial or deliberations. The third 
 
60  In twenty-one of the cases, the jurors received an instruction on life expectancy. The jurors 
mentioned the instruction in ten of the cases. They did not mention the life expectancy instruction in six 
cases in which they found in favor of the defense on liability or in another four cases in which they 
rejected the plaintiff’s claim of continuing injury. Thus, in only one of the twenty-one cases did they fail 
to discuss this instruction when it was legally relevant. 
61  N = forty-nine cases for all of these correlations due to one missing value for a judge’s rating of 
instruction complexity. 
62  R2 is the squared multiple correlation, which represents the proportion of the variation in the 
response variable (here, the time jurors spent on instructions) that is explained by the model that 
includes all three predictor variables. In contrast, each r is simply the correlation between one predictor 
variable and the response variable. 
106:1537 (2012) “Kettleful of Law” 
 1555
type of instruction, instructions about the verdict forms, was delivered just 
before the jury began its deliberations when the judge read the verdict forms 
to the jury. The instructions about the verdict forms were a hybrid of 
boilerplate (e.g., directions to select a foreperson) and case-specific 
information (e.g., information on the verdict forms that depended on the 
claims in the case). To track where in the instructions the jurors focused 
their attention, we identified whether each juror’s comment referred to a 
general (boilerplate) instruction, a specific (case-specific) instruction, or a 
verdict form (hybrid) instruction. 
Not surprisingly, the primary focus of the jurors was on case-specific 
instructions, which accounted for 72.2% of all instruction references. 
Comments about the verdict form instructions, which occurred primarily at 
the end of deliberations, accounted for 10.3% of the instruction references. 
Nonetheless, jurors did not ignore the boilerplate instructions: these 
instructions accounted for 17.5% of the juror comments relating to 
instructions. For example, regarding the admonition not to speculate: 
JUROR #1: Well, he missed those hours [of work], but how, that is not to  
   say he didn’t get paid when he was gone. If you or I get in a car  
   accident— 
JUROR #8: [interrupting] But we can’t consider that, that’s speculation. 
JUROR #2: Because we don’t know that. 
JUROR #3: Yeah, even though we would like to. 
On more than half of the juries (62%), at least one juror warned another 
juror not to speculate, and in a majority of those cases, the juror made a 
specific reference to the judge’s admonition. 
Similarly, the boilerplate instructions told the jurors to “[c]onsider all 
of the evidence in the light of reason, common sense, and experience,” and 
jurors noted that guidance. In almost a third (30%) of the cases, jurors 
referred to the instruction telling them to use their common sense.63 As we 
indicate below, all three types of instructions (boilerplate, case-specific, and 
hybrid) were sources of some confusion for the jurors. 
4. Accuracy of Talk About Instructions.—We coded the accuracy of 
each comment a juror made about a legal instruction.64 As Table 1 indicates, 
 
63  The attorneys tended to reinforce the advice that the jurors should use their common sense: one or 
both attorneys urged it in their closing argument in more than two-thirds (68%) of the cases. 
64  Inaccurate comments included any comment that erroneously interpreted or misapplied an 
instruction or advanced an inaccurate legal proposition. We also coded as errors questions about the law 
that included or implicitly suggested an incorrect answer (e.g., “Do we need to find the defendant liable 
if she admitted she was negligent?”). The rationale was that the question indicated juror confusion about 
the law. If a comment included both correct and incorrect content, it was coded as incorrect (e.g., “We 
should not speculate. Therefore, I think it’s going to be difficult to prove him guilty beyond a reasonable 
doubt.”). Full coding instructions are on file with the authors. The first author and law student assistants 
categorized comments about instructions as accurate or inaccurate and discussed all questions that arose. 
In addition, two experienced evidence professors reviewed a set of comments that had been coded as 
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most of the instruction comments (79.2%) were accurate across the fifty 
cases. 
TABLE 1: JUROR TALK ABOUT INSTRUCTIONS DURING DELIBERATIONS 
Nature of Instruction Comment Percent N 
              Accurate 79.16% (10,702) 
Comprehension Error 16.04%   (2169) 
              Resistance Error   3.24%     (438) 
Accuracy Ambiguous   1.55%     (210) 
Total Instruction Comments 99.99% (13,519) 
 
Table 1 also reveals that a total of 19.3% of the comments about 
instructions were incorrect (an average rate of 20.3% per case), and in a 
small percentage of instances (1.6%) the accuracy of the juror’s comment 
was ambiguous. Thus, the overall accuracy of discussion about the law was 
high. Nonetheless, jurors made 2607 legally inaccurate comments across 
the 50 cases, an average of 52 errors per case. The errors were not evenly 
distributed across the cases: half of the cases had 30 or fewer inaccurate 
comments, but 6 deliberations had more than 100 errors. The errors ranged 
from 0.0% to 67.8% of the instruction talk in these deliberations, with a 
median of 18.2%. 
The strongest predictor of the number of instruction errors was the 
length of the jury instructions (r = 0.48, p < 0.001). Together with the 
jurors’ mean rating of instruction difficulty (r = -0.41, p < 0.01), this 
accounted for 31% of the variation in number of errors across cases 
(R2 = 0.31, p < 0.001).65 Of course, deliberations tended to last longer as the 
trial length increased (r = 0.64, p < 0.001) and as jury instructions 
lengthened (r = 0.34, p < 0.02), so it is not surprising that the number of 
comments about instructions, including incorrect ones, climbed as 
deliberations lengthened (r = 0.82, p < 0.001). To test what predicted 
accuracy of instruction talk, while controlling for the length of 
deliberations, we examined possible predictors of the percent of instruction 
comments that were inaccurate. There was no significant relationship 
between trial length, instruction length, or judge or jury ratings of 
instruction difficulty, and the percent of comments about instructions that 
 
accurate or inaccurate. Both of them labeled one comment as an error that we had coded as accurate. 
The juror had said: “Fault is negligence if it is the cause [rather than a] cause of the plaintiff’s injury.” 
Although the juror then concluded that the defendant had not failed to use reasonable care so that the 
mistake had no effect on the juror’s position on liability, the coding decision was incorrect. 
65  The length of the trial and the judge’s rating of the difficulty of the instructions were also 
significantly correlated with the number of errors (r = 0.31, p < 0.01 for length of the trial and r = -0.43, 
p < 0.01, for judge’s rating), but did not account for further variance beyond that accounted for by the 
length of instructions and juror rating of complexity. 
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were incorrect (correlations ranged from 0.02 to -0.22). Thus, longer jury 
instructions are simply associated with longer deliberations and more talk 
about instructions, both accurate and inaccurate. 
Many of the errors jurors made in discussing the instructions were 
minor (e.g., making a statement that all jurors had to sign the verdict form, 
although the instructions said that only the presiding juror would sign if the 
jury was unanimous). Other errors had serious implications capable of 
affecting case outcomes (e.g., “Is that [the defendant’s] problem, or is that 
[the agent’s] problem?” in a case in which the instructions specified that the 
named agent was an agent of the defendant for purposes of the claims 
involved in the case). 
Miscomprehension was the primary source of the instruction errors 
(83.2%). The remaining errors (16.8%) reflected resistance rather than juror 
confusion, occurring when a juror understood but rejected the appropriate 
legal standard.66 In the analysis that follows, we treat the comprehension 
and resistance errors separately. Although the resistance errors were 
substantially less frequent than comprehension errors, with 8.8 resistance 
errors per case as opposed to 43.4 comprehension errors per case, the 
resistance errors reveal areas of modest conflict between jurors and the law. 
Arising from active rejection of legal rules rather than from confusion about 
what those rules are, resistance errors call for a different response. 
C. Comprehension Errors 
1. Overview of Comprehension Errors.—The comprehension errors 
revealed during deliberations took three forms.67 The first type, language 
errors, arose when a juror misunderstood the meaning of a word or phrase, 
either because the word or phrase was an unfamiliar legal term (e.g., 
tortious inference) or because the juror failed to apply the plain language of 
the instruction (e.g., the juror failed to notice an “or” or an “and”). The 
other two types of errors resulted from structural weaknesses in the 
instructions (e.g., the juror identified what appeared to be, but were not, 
inconsistencies between components of the instructions, or made 
 
66  To check the reliability of whether an error was a resistance error rather than a comprehension 
error, two coders examined all instruction errors in the same six cases and the conversation that 
preceded and followed each instruction error, coding each error comment as: (1) a comprehension error 
or (2) a resistance error, based on: (a) expressing explicit defiance in the comment itself, (b) continuing 
to offer inaccurate comments after at least two corrections from other jurors without disputing the 
accuracy of their corrections, or (c) persisting in the error after the judge responded to a question with a 
clear correction. Using the index described by Smith, supra note 50, reliability ranged from 0.89 to 1.0, 
averaging 0.95 across the six cases. Resistance comments are discussed infra Part IV.D. 
67  These three types of errors reflected a total of eleven sources of error, discussed infra Part 
IV.C.2–IV.C.4. To assess the reliability of this coding, two coders independently coded the comments in 
eight deliberations to determine the source of each error. Using Cohen’s Kappa statistic of inter-rater 
agreement for categorical items, see Jacob Cohen, A Coefficient of Agreement for Nominal Scales, 
20 EDUC. & PSYCHOL. MEASUREMENT 37 (1960), the inter-rater reliability was 0.95. 
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connections where none existed) or from omission errors, which occurred 
when the instructions did not explicitly cover a topic or issue (e.g., the 
instructions listed the legally relevant elements that would fairly 
compensate the plaintiff, but did not explicitly rule out attorney’s fees as a 
legally relevant element for compensation). Table 2 shows the distribution 
of all three types of errors, the number of cases in which each type of error 
occurred, how frequently each type of error was corrected, and the 
distribution of the errors that remained uncorrected. Corrections occurred 
when the other jurors or the judge responded to the error with the correct 
meaning or application of the law.68 














Language     601   (27.7%) 46 49.1%       306   (26.4%) 
Structural     334   (15.4%) 16 44.6%       185   (16.1%) 
Omission   1234   (56.9%) 44 46.0%       666   (57.6%) 
Total 2169 (100.0%) 48 46.7% 1157 (100.0%) 
 
As Table 2 indicates, comprehension errors occurred in nearly all of 
the cases (forty-eight out of fifty), but Table 2 also raises questions about 
the assumption that miscomprehension errors arise primarily because jurors 
cannot translate the unfamiliar language of the jury instructions. Fewer than 
three in ten (27.7%) of the inaccurate comments about instructions reflected 
language errors, an average of twelve comments per case. Moreover, almost 
half of all comprehension errors (46.7%) were explicitly corrected by 
another juror (32.3%), by the judge responding to a juror question (9.2%), 
or by both another juror and the judge (5.2%). The language errors occurred 
much less frequently than the omission errors. In the end, language errors 
accounted for only one in four uncorrected comprehension errors (26.4%). 
Omission errors, in contrast, were the most common type of error, 
accounting for more than half of both initial errors (56.9%) and uncorrected 
errors (57.6%). With this overview of the general categories of errors, we 
now turn to an analysis of the errors within each category.69 
 
68  A few judicial responses failed to answer the jurors’ question, so the error was not treated as 
corrected in these instances. 
69  Reliability of type of error was computed based on the eleven possible categories of error: two 
types of language errors, two types of structural errors, and seven types of omission errors. Because of 
the large number of coding categories, we conducted the reliability analysis based on eight cases. The 
kappa was 0.94. 
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2. Language Errors.—The opaque language of jury instructions is 
the primary culprit typically blamed for juror errors.70 We identified two 
types of language errors: (1) plain meaning errors and (2) technical meaning 
errors. Plain meaning errors occurred when a juror misread or ignored 
nontechnical language in the instructions that had the same meaning it 
would have in a nonlegal context (e.g., read or interpreted an “and” as an 
“or”). Technical language errors occurred when a juror misunderstood or 
misapplied a term that is only used in a legal context (e.g., plaintiff) or has a 
specialized legal meaning that is different from its meaning in a nonlegal 
context (e.g., competent). Table 3 shows the two types of language errors 
that occurred during these deliberations: 
TABLE 3: LANGUAGE ERRORS 






 Plain Meaning  268   (44.6%) 42 75.4%    66   (21.6%) 
Technical Meaning71  333   (55.4%) 31 27.9%  240   (78.4%) 
Total 601 (100.0%) 46 49.1% 306 (100.0%) 
a. Plain meaning.—Nearly half of the language errors (44.6%) 
occurred because a juror misread or ignored the plain language of an 
instruction. These errors occurred even though each juror had a copy of the 
jury instructions. The availability of the written instructions did, however, 
assist the jurors in correcting errors. Three-quarters (75.4%) of these “plain 
meaning” errors were explicitly corrected, often by a juror using the written 
instruction as evidence of the accurate meaning of the instruction. For 
example, in a products liability case, a juror said, “[I]t was not dangerous 
but it was defective. Now the question is: do we award any money for [it] 
being defective?” The instruction specified that liability could only be 
found if the product were both defective and unreasonably dangerous, and 
of course it was also necessary to show that the defect had caused the 
injury. Although the juror’s error was not immediately corrected, later on in 
the deliberations when the juror repeated it, another juror (referring to the 
written instruction) said, “I think the ‘and’ is important there,” and offered 
an example of how food could be burned, and therefore be defective, but 
 
70  See, e.g., Lawrence M. Solan, Refocusing the Burden of Proof in Criminal Cases: Some Doubt 
About Reasonable Doubt, 78 TEX. L. REV. 105, 119–32 (1999) (collecting articles on comprehension 
tests before offering a rationale for changing the definition of reasonable doubt provided to jurors based 
on linguistics and cognitive psychology). 
71  One hundred eighty-nine of the 333 technical meaning errors came from a single case in which 
the jurors submitted a question to the judge and the judge directed the jurors back to the page that had 
prompted the question, leaving the jurors to struggle further. Of these errors, 176 concerned a single 
phrase in the instructions that was the subject of the question, and none of these errors were corrected. 
For discussion of this case, see infra text accompanying note 73. If these 176 comments are removed, 
the percent of technical meaning errors that were corrected would rise from 27.9% to 59.2%. 
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not dangerous. The others jurors agreed with the correct interpretation. 
They ultimately found for the defense. 
In another example, a juror in a slip-and-fall case failed to recognize 
that the instruction described multiple alternative ways that could lead to a 
finding that the defendant had notice of a dangerous condition—missing the 
“or” in the instruction. The juror said: “If they didn’t do something to create 
a dangerous condition, they’re not responsible.” Although the relevant 
instruction indicated that creating a dangerous condition was one way that a 
defendant might obtain notice of the condition, this juror failed to note the 
two other ways set out in the instruction that could also provide an 
attribution of the requisite notice: if the defendant had actual knowledge or 
if the condition had existed for long enough that the defendant should have 
known about it. Although no one corrected the error in this case, the jurors 
concluded that the defendant had created the dangerous condition, so the 
error did not influence the course of the jury’s deliberations or the outcome 
of the case. 
Even words that were understandable sometimes caused difficulty 
when the concept was counterintuitive for some jurors. A case involving a 
claim about a product purchased from a corporation by a consumer included 
an instruction for the jury on agency law. The instruction explained that a 
corporation can act only through its employees, agents, directors, or 
officers, and that the defendant corporation admitted that another company 
was its agent for purposes of the claims in the case. Several of the jurors 
were willing to accept the agency relationship only after a juror pointed out 
the specific instruction. 
b. Technical meaning.—Technical legal language was the 
second source of language errors for the jurors. When the jury encountered 
a term they recognized as undefined and unfamiliar, they sent the judge a 
question about it (e.g., tortious). The more common source of confusion 
from technical language arose when a legal term of art consisted of words 
that were familiar to jurors in other contexts. For example, the jurors who 
were told, “An owner is competent to testify as to the value of his vehicle, 
whether they are qualified as an expert or not,” did not understand that the 
instruction merely permitted the owner to state what he thought the car was 
worth.72 Instead, they interpreted the instruction as a way of saying that the 
owner should be assumed to know the value of the vehicle: 
 
72  It was arguably odd to provide an instruction to the jury on this issue at all because the decision to 
permit the owner to testify about the value of the vehicle was an admissibility question reached by the 
judge. 
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JUROR #7: Isn’t it saying here that [inaudible] the owner—whether being  
   an expert or not—can determine the worth of the vehicle? 
JUROR #1: Yeah, the owner can determine . . . . 
The culprit was the use of the phrase “competent to testify,” a phrase with a 
specialized meaning in a legal context. Similarly, the mental state required 
for liability is a crucial element in law. Jurors in tort cases are generally 
instructed on negligence, but their deliberations sometimes suggest that 
they are evaluating the defendant on a mental state more appropriate to an 
intentional tort or a criminal act. For example, a juror argued on behalf of a 
defendant: “[The defendant’s action] wasn’t intentional.” In another case, a 
juror confused knowledge and negligence: 
JUROR #1: But if he didn’t know the law, how is he negligent? If he didn’t  
   have any idea . . . . 
And in a third case, a juror expressed discomfort with holding a teenager 
fully responsible for an injury he caused: 
JUROR #9: I know he hurt him, but [the defendant] was a kid. It was an  
   accident. He didn’t purposely set out to be negligent. He was  
   just being a kid; he was stupid. 
And on occasion, jurors simply got tangled up in the language. For 
example, jurors were evaluating the standard for judging the fault of a 
defendant when a fire broke out after the defendant repaired the plaintiff’s 
furnace. The misstatements of Jurors #3 and #6 focusing on intentionality 
were corrected by Juror #1: 
JUROR #3: It was because of the work [by the defendant] that was done  
   that it happened, but there was no intentional negligence. 
JUROR #6: Right, exactly. It was an accident. 
JUROR #3: It was not done intentionally. 
JUROR #1: But [the instruction] does not say intentional, does it? 
JUROR #6: No. 
JUROR #3: No, it doesn’t. 
JUROR #6: It just says, “Negligence is the failure to use reasonable care.” 
On another occasion, jurors misunderstood the meaning of a technical 
category that was expressed in general terms. The jurors carefully read the 
instruction on damages, focusing on the phrase “services rendered.” They 
concluded that it directed the jury to include an award for attorney’s fees.73 
This outlier case accounted for more than half of the total technical 
 
73  This interpretation was not irrational; the damages section in the instructions (as in other standard 
pattern instructions) included the following elements of damages: “Reasonable expenses of necessary 
medical care, treatment, and services rendered.” The reference to services rendered is intended to refer 
only to medical services, but the phrasing is hardly unambiguous. 
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language errors in the entire set of fifty cases.74 As the jurors in this case 
struggled to determine how much they should add for attorney’s fees, they 
submitted a question to the judge, who responded by advising them to look 
at the damages page in the instructions. They had already focused their 
attention on that page, so the judge’s response provided no assistance in 
correcting their misunderstanding, and they interpreted the answer as 
requiring them to estimate the attorney’s fees. The result is that they 
explicitly added one-third to the damage award that the group had already 
assessed. 
In thirty cases (60%), a juror referred to the burden or standard of 
proof during deliberations. Most of the 175 references were correct (81%). 
For example: 
JUROR #8: I read that [the standard of proof] as being [a] very, very low  
   standard, 50%, greater than 50%, so it’s just more probably  
   true than not. 
JUROR #5: It’s not like beyond a reasonable doubt. 
JUROR #8: We’re not up there on the high. It’s just— 
JUROR #6: That’s correct. 
JUROR #4: I agree with that. 
JUROR #6: But the burden is on the plaintiff. 
JUROR #3: On the plaintiff, not on the defendant. 
JUROR #8: That’s right. He has to prove, more probably true than not true,  
   which is just about 50%, so it’s something to keep in mind. 
Nonetheless, thirty-three (19%) of the references were incorrect. These 
errors occurred in fifteen cases and were typically made by a single juror 
who applied the reasonable doubt standard from criminal law when the 
relevant standard was a preponderance of the evidence. For example, a juror 
in a medical malpractice case voiced “reasonable doubt” about what caused 
the plaintiff’s injury, although in the end he supported finding the defendant 
liable. In a second case, involving an automobile accident, a juror voiced 
“reasonable doubt” about whether the accident caused the injury: 
JUROR #8: But we have a reasonable doubt as to whether or not the  
   [injuries] are from the accident. 
A juror in a third case used “reasonable doubt” to evaluate the plaintiff’s 
credibility: “I think we have a reasonable doubt [as] to his credibility.” On a 
few occasions, a juror mentioning reasonable doubt was technically 
incorrect in the use of the phrase, but may have been using the phrase for 
emphasis, rather than as a standard of proof. For example, in a case 
involving a plaintiff whose vehicle hit the back of another car and who 
claimed that the automobile accident occurred because the driver in front 
had been going too slowly for conditions: 
 
74  See supra note 71. 
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JUROR #7: Okay, beyond a reasonable doubt I would say . . . [the driver]  
   should have had enough time to stop the vehicle at least down  
   to thirty. 
The jury instructions in these cases never mentioned the phrase 
“beyond a reasonable doubt,” but the phrase is so much a part of the 
common vernacular that it understandably creeps into the language that 
jurors use. The attorneys in thirty-four of the cases discussed the standard of 
proof in their closing arguments.75 In fifteen of these thirty-four cases, one 
of the attorneys attempted to clarify the standard of proof in these civil 
cases by contrasting it with the beyond a reasonable doubt standard of proof 
in a criminal case.76 Juror errors discussing the standard of proof occurred in 
two of the fifteen cases in which an attorney offered the contrast, and in 
eight of the nineteen cases in which attorneys mentioned the standard of 
proof but did not explicitly offer the contrast with beyond a reasonable 
doubt. Although a larger sample would be needed to test the stability of this 
difference (the difference between two cases out of fifteen (13%) versus 
eight cases out of nineteen (42%) is not statistically significant77), 
contrasting examples tend to aid comprehension in educational settings, so 
it would not be surprising if an explicit contrast helped jurors to understand 
the meaning of the standard of proof. Indeed, some courts do include this 
contrast in their instructions rather than depending on attorney argument to 
supply it, which is a more dependable way to ensure that the correct 
message is conveyed.78 
 
75  Note that the jury instructions in all cases mentioned who had the burden of proof for each claim 
and specified what the standard of proof was (e.g., in negligence cases, that “the claim is more probably 
true than not”). In fifteen cases, the standard of proof was not mentioned in closing arguments, and in a 
sixteenth, we were unable to obtain a transcript of the closing arguments. 
76  In one of the fifteen cases, the contrast offered was between “clear and convincing” proof and the 
standard of “more probably true than not true.” 
77  Even if the two sets of cases differ in their rates of error, with only a total of thirty-four cases, the 
comparison does not have sufficient statistical power to confidently reject the possibility that a 
difference, even one as large as the one obtained here (13% vs. 42%), could be due to chance. For 
further information on power and statistical significance, see JACOB COHEN, STATISTICAL POWER 
ANALYSIS FOR THE BEHAVIORAL SCIENCES (2d ed. 1988). 
78  See, e.g., FED. JUDICIAL CTR., PATTERN CRIMINAL JURY INSTRUCTIONS 28 (1987) (“Some of you 
may have served as jurors in civil cases, where you were told that it is only necessary to prove that a fact 
is more likely true than not true. In criminal cases, the government’s proof must be more powerful than 
that. It must be beyond a reasonable doubt.”); JUDICIAL COUNCIL OF CALIFORNIA CIVIL JURY 
INSTRUCTIONS, CACI No. 200, (2012), available at http://www.courts.ca.gov/partners/documents/
caci_2012_edtion.pdf (“In criminal trials, the prosecution must prove that the defendant is guilty beyond 
a reasonable doubt. But in civil trials, such as this one, the party who is required to prove something 
need prove only that it is more likely to be true than not true.”); see also Elisabeth Stoffelmayr & Shari 
Seidman Diamond, The Conflict Between Precision and Flexibility in Explaining “Beyond a Reasonable 
Doubt,” 6 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 769, 777‒78 (2000) (concluding that criminal-case jury 
instructions that explicitly contrast the relative burdens of proof in criminal versus civil cases are more 
effective in focusing jurors on the evidence, rather than subjective moral beliefs or personal 
experiences). 
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A third of the thirty-three errors that jurors made in discussing the 
burden or standard of proof were corrected by other jurors, leaving twenty-
two uncorrected comprehension errors about burden or standard of proof. In 
addition, jurors on two cases persisted in misusing the standard after several 
jurors corrected them, suggesting that their comments may have reflected 
resistance rather than errors based on miscomprehension. 
A final group of sixteen technical language errors occurred because 
jury instructions often use general descriptors for the parties and other 
relevant individuals or businesses involved in the lawsuit, such as 
“employer.” When the referent is clear because there is only one plaintiff 
and one defendant, that approach causes no difficulty. However, when the 
defendants vary for different claims (e.g., when some claims apply to a 
defendant employee as an individual and other claims apply to the employer 
through the actions of the employee), jurors may occasionally struggle to 
identify the appropriate defendant for each claim. Similarly, in comparative 
fault cases, the defendant rather than the plaintiff has the burden of proof to 
show that the plaintiff was at fault. Jurors in those cases, while correctly 
identifying the defendant as the party with the burden of proof, simply 
called that party the plaintiff for that claim. For example, in a case of 
comparative fault: 
JUROR #3: [W]hat I’m having a problem [with is] that . . . the defendants  
   were the cause, but [the plaintiff] is also one of the  
   defendants . . . . 
The technical language errors tended to confuse individual jurors on 
occasion, but in only one trial was there clear evidence that language 
miscomprehension affected the damages awarded by the jury. In that case, 
described earlier,79 the jury explicitly agreed to add attorney’s fees for 
“service rendered.” A majority of the jurors participated in the conversation 
about the proper amount to add, and no juror questioned the legitimacy of 
including attorney’s fees as an appropriate component of services rendered. 
On other juries, evidence of language miscomprehension was reflected only 
in the comments of a few jurors, and, although the error may have 
influenced an individual juror’s thinking, it did not explicitly emerge as a 
basis for the jury’s verdict. 
3. Structural Errors.—Jury instructions cover a range of issues. 
Some of these issues are related to one another, as when a claim of 
negligent supervision is contingent on another underlying claim. Others are 
unrelated. Jury instructions, however, do not explicitly signal when 
instructions are related and how these relationships function. As a result, 
jurors sometimes assume connections that are unwarranted and miss 
connections that are present. The failure to disclose the structure of 
 
79  See supra note 73 and accompanying text. 
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relationships among the instructions is promoted by the piecemeal way in 
which jury instructions are produced. Each side submits a set of proposed 
instructions, each on a separate page.80 Instructions are then typically 
assembled by piecing together a set of separate instructions that cover 
different topics (e.g., the concept that corporations and individuals are 
entitled to the same fair and impartial consideration, the elements required 
for a claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress, the potential 
categories of damages), with a separate instruction on each page. This 
piecemeal approach enables the court, with the assistance of the parties, to 
create a packet of instructions by inserting acceptable individual 
instructions proposed by one of the parties, modifying, substituting, or 
adding instructions where necessary. To apply the law, however, jurors 
must be able to interpret the instructions in light of one another, so that if 
related instructions in the final packet do not appear on the same page or on 
adjacent pages, jurors may not see the connection or relevant differences 
between them. The patchwork construction of instructions provides no 
guidance in identifying connections, that is, in distinguishing between 
related and unrelated instructions. 
The primary elements in civil cases concern claims, liability 
requirements, and damage instructions. We identified two types of 
structural errors: (1) mistakes from combining unrelated claims, liability 
standards, or damage instructions, or inappropriately distinguishing 
between related claims, liability standards, and damage instructions; and 
(2) other combination errors. As Table 4 indicates, structural errors 
occurred in nearly a third of the cases (sixteen of fifty) as jurors attempted 
to combine related instructions and avoid combining unrelated ones. 
TABLE 4: STRUCTURAL ERRORS 









Claims/Liability/Damages 160   (47.9%) 10 26.9% 117   (63.2%) 
Other Combination Errors 174   (52.1%)   9 60.9%   68    (36.8%) 
Total 334 (100.0%) 16 44.6% 185 (100.0%) 
a. Fitting together claims/liability/damages.—The first type of 
structural error, accounting for almost half of the errors in this category, 
involves fitting together the basic components of civil cases: claims, 
liability, and damages. Juries in civil cases are often faced with multiple 
 
80  See, e.g., D. OR. LOCAL R. CIV. P. 51-1(d), available at http://www.ord.uscourts.gov/en/local-
rules-of-civil-procedure-2012/lr-51-instructions-to-the-jury (“Format Requirements: (1) Each instruction 
must begin on a separate page. . . . (3) Each instruction must embrace only one subject . . . .”). The trials 
in the Arizona Jury Project used the Oregon format as well. 
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claims and, when liability is contested, must be instructed on both liability 
and damages. While half the cases in the Arizona Jury Project involved a 
single claim against one defendant, the remaining half contained more 
complex allegations: multiple claims, claims and counterclaims, 
comparative fault, or an alleged nonparty at fault. All of the errors involving 
fitting together claims or liability and damages occurred in ten of the 
twenty-five cases with more complex claim structures. Because this source 
of confusion in jury instructions has not been identified in any prior 
research, we give several examples of the challenges jurors faced by having 
to link different parts of the instructions together. Thus, for example, 
confusion in one case arose among multiple claims that included a 
contingent claim of negligent supervision. Unless the jury found the 
employee liable for one of the multiple underlying tort claims, they could 
not find the defendant employer liable for negligent supervision. No single 
sentence in the instructions expressed precisely this point, which would 
have likely assisted the jurors in linking the underlying claims against the 
employee to those concerning the employer. It took an extended discussion 
by the jury81 and a question to the judge before this relationship among the 
claims was clarified. 
A second case involved claims of breach of contract and violation of 
the duty of good faith and fair dealing, which lead to different damage 
categories, the benefit of the bargain for the breach of contract claim and 
consequential damages (e.g., emotional distress, inconvenience, anxiety) for 
the claimed violation of the duty of good faith and fair dealing. The jurors 
believed that they had awarded all that was appropriate on the breach of 
contract claim and then struggled with the verdict forms, which included 
information about the other claim. The placement of the damages elements 
on separate pages of the jury instructions made it difficult for the jurors to 
match them with the appropriate claims. Sheepishly, they asked the judge 
for help and only at that point were able to come up with a solution. 
The instructions in tort cases tell the jury that fault requires a showing 
of negligence, causation, and damages.82 Most jurors in the study 
understood that damages cannot be awarded unless negligence is shown, 
but in five cases, a juror missed the connection between the need to show 
negligence as well as causation and damages in order to find fault, 
expressing the desire to make an award without finding the defendant 
negligent. In all five cases, that preference immediately drew a response 
from fellow jurors who cited the instructions as authority for negligence as 
a necessary predicate to liability. 
The more common errors involving fit concerned the fit between 
claims and damages as jurors negotiated the relationship between liability 
 
81  The discussion spanned eighty-three minutes of deliberations. 
82  See RAJI (CIVIL) 3d, supra note 55, Fault 1–3, at 33‒35. 
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and damages. When a case involves claims of comparative fault and the 
jury determines that the defendant was at least partially at fault, the legal 
standard calls for the jury to identify the full damages suffered by the 
plaintiff and the percentage of fault attributable to the plaintiff.83 The court 
then will reduce the total damages by the percentage attributable to the 
plaintiff, and the plaintiff will receive the resulting damage award.84 The 
jurors in the fourteen cases involving comparative fault were instructed to 
determine first whether the defendant was at fault to any degree, then to 
determine total damages, and finally to decide the comparative fault 
percentage allocation.85 This order, which required the jurors to move from 
liability (is there any?) to damages and back to liability (comparative fault 
allocation), appears to conflict with the natural inclination of the jurors, 
who violated the instruction in five of the nine comparative fault cases in 
which they found the defendant at least partially at fault. In these five cases, 
they determined the percentage allocation of fault before turning to the 
consideration of damages. 
In the comparative fault cases, the more serious error in following the 
instruction occurred in the computation of the damages. Late in the 
instructions, jurors are told that if they find the defendant liable, they must 
decide the full amount of money that will reasonably and fairly compensate 
the plaintiff for a set of case-specific elements of damages.86 In four cases, 
the jurors decided what they thought the plaintiff should receive and raised 
the damage amount to preserve the amount that would remain after the 
 
83  See id. Fault 8, at 40. 
84  Arizona is a pure comparative fault jurisdiction in which damages are reduced in proportion to 
the percentage of fault attributed to the plaintiff. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-2505(A) (2003). 
85  The following instruction was given in each of the fourteen cases involving an allegation of 
comparative fault between the plaintiff and defendant: 
 If you find that defendant was not at fault, then your verdict must be for defendant. 
 If you find that defendant was at fault, then defendant is liable to plaintiff and your verdict 
must be for plaintiff. You should then determine the full amount of plaintiff’s damages and enter 
that amount on the verdict form. You should then consider defendant’s claim that plaintiff was at 
fault . . . . 
RAJI (CIVIL) 3d, supra note 55, Fault 8, at 40. 
86  The instruction stated: 
 If you find [any] defendant liable to plaintiff, you must then decide the full amount of money 
that will reasonably and fairly compensate plaintiff or each of the following elements of damages 
proved by the evidence to have resulted from the fault of [any] [defendant] [party] [person]: 
 (1) The nature, extent, and duration of the injury. 
 (2) The pain, discomfort, suffering, disability, disfigurement, and anxiety already 
  experienced, and reasonably probable to be experienced in the future as a result of the  
  injury. 
 (3) Reasonable expenses of necessary medical care, treatment, and services rendered, and  
  reasonably probable to be incurred in the future. 
 (4) Lost earnings to date, and any decrease in earning power or capacity in the future. 
 (5) Loss of love, care, affection, companionship, and other pleasure of the [marital] [family] 
relationship. 
Id. Personal Injury Damages 1, at 112 (footnote omitted). 
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percentage of plaintiff liability was subtracted from the total damage 
amount. Thus, they fused the liability and damage decisions in order to 
arrive at what they viewed as fair compensation. There was no indication 
that these jurors realized they were not following the instructions. Thus, the 
juries typically would carefully assess the legitimacy of each amount 
claimed (e.g., how much really would have been earned, whether the 
plaintiff needed all of the treatment, how much the likely future medical 
costs would actually be), frequently substantially reducing the requested 
amounts to arrive at what they viewed as more reasonable estimates of 
expenses. Nonetheless, many of the jurors explicitly expressed concern 
about whether the plaintiff would receive enough to cover the costs incurred 
by the plaintiff and considered how to produce an award that would reflect 
both their assessment of comparative fault and a way to arrive at the 
compensation level they thought was appropriate for the injured party. For 
example: 
JUROR #3: I was taking the total and then multiplying it by 1.2 and then  
   we throw whatever makes it to that total in medical and then  
   we know when they take the 80% with a 20% reduction it will  
   be back to the full value without any more pain and suffering.87 
The jury accepted this calculation in arriving at its award. In a second case, 
in which the jurors saw the plaintiff and defendant as more equally at fault, 
the jurors also agreed that they would have to raise the total damages to 
“gross it up” to enable the plaintiff to “pay her bills and pay for Tylenol and 
go to the chiropractor again.” A third jury, having determined that the 
plaintiff was 25% at fault, raised the award to cover “the percentage she 
will lose due to fault.” A fourth jury, having decided to allocate 20% of the 
fault to the plaintiff, agreed to raise the award according to the formula 
suggested by one of the jurors: “So, he’s gonna [sic] get four-fifths of X. If 
we want X to be the right amount to get there, you need to have five-fourths 
of it which is one and one-fourth which is 1.25.” 
Each of the other five juries making awards in comparative fault cases 
had at least one comment either indicating an error in considering damages 
before allocating percentage of fault or a juror who wanted to adjust the 
damage level to affect the ultimate award. But unlike the juries described in 
the preceding paragraph, none of these five juries explicitly adjusted their 
award with an eye toward what the plaintiff would receive in light of the 
comparative fault percentages. However, several jurors on these cases 
argued for higher damage levels, recognizing that the amounts they were 
discussing would be reduced by the percent of fault. Juror #4 takes this 
 
87  The math calculation is in error here. If the jurors decided that the plaintiff should end up with 
$10,000 and awarded $10,000 × 1.2, the award of $12,000 would be reduced by 20% and would end up 
being $9,600. The appropriate multiplier to achieve the jury’s goal would be to multiply by 1.25. 
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position in the following example, arguing in favor of a higher total damage 
amount: 
JUROR #6: Well, I might give him $[X]88 the first year, ’cause [sic] he did  
   suffer a lot. 
JUROR #4: I would leave it at $[2X] ’cause [sic] he still is going to lose  
   half of that and he’s just going to get $[X] of it. 
Thus, the demands on the jury to assess liability and damages as separate 
decisions are difficult for the jurors to understand and follow in 
comparative fault cases, at least as jury instructions are currently 
constructed. Before comparative fault emerged as the dominant legal 
regime for torts, some legal scholars advocated the use of bifurcated trials 
that separated consideration of liability and damages.89 The behavior of the 
jurors in these comparative fault cases adds additional evidence questioning 
the jury’s ability to separate liability and damages. We have considered 
these fusions of liability and damage assessments to reflect comprehension 
problems. Alternatively, the jurors in these cases may be revealing a 
preferred theory of damages that the law does not currently recognize: 
injured plaintiffs should be entitled to recover some of the costs associated 
with injuries that were caused by the defendant’s negligence (e.g., medical 
expenses, but not pain and suffering), even if the plaintiff contributed to the 
injuries. Either way, the deliberations of these juries suggest that 
instructions under the current legal rules have not fully achieved the goal of 
separating consideration of liability and damages in comparative fault cases. 
Errors occurred frequently in the comparative fault cases, most of the errors 
remained uncorrected, and the amount of damages awarded was affected in 
at least four of the nine comparative fault cases that involved damages. 
b. Other combination errors.—Faced with pages of instructions, 
the jurors occasionally compared other unrelated instructions and 
incorrectly found connections between them where none existed. 
Examination of these errors offers clues about the types of instructions that 
are likely to produce such errors. For example, when a corporation or a 
business is a party, jurors generally receive an instruction admonishing 
them to give the corporation or business the same consideration they would 
 
88  In this and other quotes from deliberations, some damage amounts or irrelevant factual details 
were changed to protect the identity of the case, consistent with our obligation to preserve 
confidentiality. In some instances, the symbols X and Y were substituted for specific dollar amounts or 
names used in juror comments. 
89  See Julius H. Miner, Court Congestion: A New Approach, 45 A.B.A. J. 1265, 1268 (1959); 
Warren F. Schwartz, Severance—A Means of Minimizing the Role of Burden and Expense in 
Determining the Outcome of Litigation, 20 VAND. L. REV. 1197, 1198, 1214 (1967). For a contrary 
view, see Jack B. Weinstein, Routine Bifurcation of Jury Negligence Trials: An Example of the 
Questionable Use of Rule Making Power, 14 VAND. L. REV. 831, 852–53 (1961). For an empirical 
assessment, see Hans Zeisel & Thomas Callahan, Split Trials and Time Saving: A Statistical Analysis, 
76 HARV. L. REV. 1606 (1963). 
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give an individual.90 Fifteen of our fifty cases involved a corporate or other 
business party, and in eleven of them, the jury received this instruction. In 
two of the cases involving a corporate defendant, a juror specifically 
mentioned the instruction, referring correctly to the requirement that a 
corporation or business be treated fairly. In others, although jurors did not 
reference the instruction, they talked about the importance of treating the 
corporation fairly. Yet any party in a case, including a corporation, may 
have special duties that other parties do not have. For example, in a case 
involving a manufacturer’s warranty, a juror used the admonition regarding 
equal treatment of corporations to defend the corporation’s alleged 
unwillingness to honor the warranty: 
JUROR #3: It says here on page nine that a corporation is entitled to the  
   same thing as an individual. If you went out and bought the  
   refrigerator from, you know, your buddy, John, and eleven  
   months later the motor went bad, do you, do you really think  
   that you  should be able to go back to your buddy, John, and  
   say, “You know what? I’m not happy with this refrigerator  
   anymore. You have to give me my money back, you know,  
   because your motor, my motor went out.” I mean it’s a used  
   refrigerator, so . . . . 
As the manufacturer of the product, the defendant in this case did have a 
different obligation than John would have had, yet Juror #3 read the general 
corporation instruction into the language describing the obligations of the 
seller and was convinced that the instruction reduced the corporation’s 
responsibility to the purchaser. 
In another case in which a juror inaccurately combined unrelated 
instructions, the jurors had to determine whether the behavior of the 
defendant was “extreme and outrageous.” They were provided with this 
definition: “Extreme and outrageous conduct is conduct that an average 
member of the community would regard as atrocious and beyond all 
possible bounds of decency.” As part of the damage instructions, the jurors 
also received the so-called “eggshell plaintiff” instruction: 
You must decide the full amount of money that will reasonably and fairly 
compensate plaintiff for all damages caused by the fault of defendant, even if 
plaintiff was more susceptible to injury than a normally healthy person would 
have been, and even if a normally healthy person would not have suffered 
similar injury. 
 
90  For example: 
 A corporation is a party in this lawsuit. Corporations and individuals are entitled to the same 
fair and impartial consideration and to justice reached by the same legal standards. 
 When I use the word “person” in these instructions, or when I use any personal pronoun 
referring to a party, those instructions also apply to ______________. 
RAJI (CIVIL) 3d, supra note 55, Standard 11, at 26. 
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Several jurors were confused when they tried to put the two instructions 
together: 
JUROR #9: They define for us the “extreme and outrageous,” but then I  
   think it gets back to the 14b instructions [the eggshell plaintiff  
   instruction] which is also saying that you have to look at that  
   and say a normal person may not have been affected by that,  
   but this is not a normal, healthy person. 
JUROR #4: Right. 
* * * 
JUROR #6: 14b [the eggshell plaintiff instruction] may help decide  
   whether [defendant’s] actions were extreme or outrageous. 
The distinction between the instructions is that one is designed to help the 
jury determine liability by assessing whether the defendant intentionally or 
recklessly caused emotional distress (i.e., plaintiff’s actions must be 
extreme and outrageous as an objective standard), and the other should be 
used by the jury in determining how much a plaintiff should receive for 
damages (i.e., the eggshell plaintiff, who is more severely injured than the 
average person, is entitled to recover more than the average person). The 
instructions, however, provide the jury with little guidance in recognizing 
this distinction. Moreover, by placing the definition of “extreme and 
outrageous” on a separate page, rather than offering it as part of the 
instructions on what the plaintiff had to prove to find the defendant liable, it 
was easier for a juror to conclude that another part of the instructions 
supplied the relevant definition.91 Perhaps surprisingly, most of the jurors in 
this case ultimately focused on the appropriate standard for liability, 
determining that even if the plaintiff was more susceptible to injury, the 
behavior of the defendant did not meet the definition of “extreme and 
outrageous.” 
Cases involving multiple parties can pose a problem for the jurors who 
must grapple with determining which instructions apply to each party. For 
example, in a comparative fault case involving an automobile accident, the 
jury had to decide whether the defendant was at fault for any of the injuries. 
If so, the jury had to allocate fault between the two drivers. The jury had no 
difficulty understanding the allocation of fault between the two drivers. The 
problem arose because a second plaintiff was a passenger of the injured 
driver and the jury found the defendant only partially at fault. As a result, 
 
91  The claim instruction read:  
 Plaintiff claims that defendant intentionally or recklessly caused [him] [her] emotional distress. 
 To establish this claim, plaintiff must prove: 
 (1) Defendant’s action or inaction was extreme and outrageous; 
 (2) Defendant either intended to cause emotional distress or recklessly disregarded the near  
certainty that such distress would result from [his] [her] [its] conduct; and 
 (3) Plaintiff sustained severe emotional distress as a result of a defendant’s conduct. 
Id. Employment Law 16, at 211. 
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the jury had to complete separate verdict forms for the driver and the 
passenger in the plaintiff’s car. The jury was confused about whether the 
same comparative fault percentages should apply to the plaintiff driver and 
his passenger, or whether the plaintiff driver and passenger might have 
different percentages of fault vis-à-vis the defendant. The jury ultimately 
submitted a question to the judge who clarified that a single percentage was 
to be applied to the two plaintiffs. 
In another case, the jurors struggled to determine how to fit the 
percentage of fault allocation with the total damages when the injury was 
due in part to a preexisting problem. That is, the jurors were unclear as to 
whether they should adjust the damage amount for the preexisting injury or 
adjust the percentage of fault to account for the preexisting injury. The 
instructions tell the jurors to decide total damages caused by the defendant’s 
negligence and to allocate fault, but the instructions do not specifically 
address the relationship to any preexisting injury. In this case, it took a 
question to the judge to get an explicit explanation. 
Other structural errors occurred when individual jurors attempted to 
combine unrelated instructions. In one case, a juror assumed that a claim 
and counterclaim—both of which involved allegations of intentional 
interference—should somehow be related (after the jury reached a verdict 
for the defendant on the initial claim, a juror asked, “But shouldn’t both of 
them [the claim and the counterclaim] sort of correlate?”). The juror was 
not corrected and the jury ultimately found in favor of the defendant on the 
counterclaim. In another case, a juror concluded that liability should not be 
found because he was not convinced the defendant had malice, applying the 
“evil mind” state-of-mind instruction for punitive damages92 to the 
underlying claim, which required only a showing of negligence. 
Structural problems can also arise when the meaning of one instruction 
depends on incorporating the meaning of another instruction. For example, 
standard instructions tell jurors: “You will decide what the facts are from 
 
92  This instruction stated: 
 If you find defendant liable to plaintiff, you may consider assessing additional damages to 
punish defendant or to deter defendant and others from similar misconduct in the future. Such 
damages are called “punitive” or “exemplary” damages. 
 To recover such damages, plaintiff has the burden of proving by clear and convincing 
evidence, either direct or circumstantial, that defendant acted with an evil mind. 
 This required state of mind may be shown by any of the following: 
 (1) Intent to cause injury; or 
 (2) Wrongful conduct motivated by spite or ill will; or 
 (3) [Defendant acted to serve his own interests, having reason to know and consciously  
disregarding a substantial risk that his conduct might significantly injure the rights of 
others.] 
  [Defendant consciously pursued a course of conduct knowing that it created a substantial  
  risk of significant harm to others.] 
Id. Personal Injury Damages 4, at 115 (footnote omitted). 
106:1537 (2012) “Kettleful of Law” 
 1573
the evidence presented here in court.”93 Instructions may also—as in 
Arizona—warn jurors not to speculate (“You must not speculate or guess 
about any fact.”).94 A third instruction attempts to guide the jury’s judgment 
on the credibility of witnesses (“In deciding the facts of this case, you 
should consider what testimony to accept, and what to reject.”).95 Following 
standard procedure, courts deliver these three admonitions at different 
points in the presentation of the jury instructions, and this separation makes 
it more likely that the jurors will consider one of the admonitions without 
connecting it to the related instructions. For example, in one of the Arizona 
trials, one party provided evidence on an important issue, while the 
opposing party offered no evidence on that same issue. The jury had the 
following exchange (the plaintiff claimed that the reconditioned item he 
purchased from the defendant was defective): 
JUROR #3: I don’t think we’re supposed to speculate about [whether it was  
   fixed] because if they didn’t give any evidence to the contrary,  
   then we’re supposed to assume the evidence that, which we  
   got, shows that it was fixed. Because, you know, there was no  
   evidence—there’s evidence that it was fixed, there’s no  
   evidence that it wasn’t fixed. I mean, it didn’t work afterward,  
   but you could, you know, you know you could fix it and have  
   it break. 
JUROR #2: Yeah. 
Thus, the jurors felt compelled by the jury instructions to accept the 
evidence presented by one side. They focused on the admonitions that they 
should confine themselves to the evidence and that they should not 
speculate, but failed to recognize that the third related instruction, which 
charged them with deciding whether or not to accept testimony that was 
presented, could have properly led them to reject the presented evidence as 
unconvincing. A similar misunderstanding apparently arose in the 
Pennzoil–Texaco multibillion-dollar contract trial. James Shannon, a 
member of the jury, recounted that in deciding on damages, the jury had 
carefully followed Judge Casseb’s instructions to not consider anything not 
represented by the evidence.96 According to Shannon, the jury accepted 
Pennzoil’s $7.53 billion damage estimate because Texaco, arguing solely 
against liability, had presented no evidence on damages.97 
Jurors occasionally raised questions about the introduction of personal 
experience into deliberations on similar grounds. Since they were instructed 
to decide only on the basis of the evidence presented at trial, it was 
 
93  Id. Preliminary 2, at 4; id. Standard 2, at 17. 
94  Id. Preliminary 1, at 3; id. Standard 1, at 16 (“You should not speculate or guess about any 
fact.”). 
95  Id. Preliminary 4, at 6; id. Standard 6, at 21. 
96  See JAMES SHANNON, TEXACO AND THE $10 BILLION JURY 476–77 (1988). 
97  Id. 
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therefore unclear whether their experiences outside of court could be 
considered relevant. Yet jury instructions directly acknowledge that a chief 
source of the jury’s value is the ability of its members to draw on their life 
experiences, the jury’s so-called “common sense.” Thus, in Arizona, the 
jury is instructed: “Consider all of the evidence in light of reason, common 
sense, and experience.”98 But the jury is also warned: “You will decide what 
the facts are from the evidence presented here in court.”99 The juxtaposition 
of these two admonitions can lead to uncertainty. Some jurors who 
conscientiously focused on the admonition to decide only on the evidence 
were unsure whether or not their personal experiences as drivers or accident 
victims could be discussed during deliberations. Clearly, that experience 
could not be characterized as evidence, and it certainly was not produced in 
court.100 At the same time, many jurors recognized that their prior 
experiences could help them understand the evidence, and the instruction to 
consider the evidence in light of their experiences appears to invite them to 
do just that. Although the jurors generally handled this situation reasonably 
(i.e., drawing on personal experience, but cutting off a juror who tried to 
argue at length that his accident history should inform the group), some 
further instruction on the use of personal experience in deliberations may 
avoid the occasional conflict on this issue. Because jurors were explicitly 
told in the instructions that they should consider the evidence in light of 
experience, we did not consider their frequent use of personal experience to 
be in error. 
Finally, jurors are sometimes asked to consider the fault of a nonparty. 
If the jury decides that the nonparty is partially responsible for causing the 
damages and the party defendant is partially responsible, the jury can find 
for the plaintiff and apportion fault between the defendant and the nonparty. 
The defendant will then pay the portion of damages consistent with his 
percentage of fault. If, however, the jury determines that the defendant is 
not at fault, the jury cannot “award” damages to the plaintiff against the 
nonparty. In one case, a jury faced with this situation struggled to 
understand the relationship among the various verdict forms. Some of the 
jurors did not immediately see why they could not complete the verdict 
form in favor of the defendant, as well as the verdict form holding the 
nonparty liable and awarding damages to the plaintiff. When the judge 
confirmed that it was not possible, they found for the defendant. 
In sum, these structural problems obstructed juror comprehension of 
the instructions. When jurors are not supplied with the connective tissue 
between, for example, multiple separate claims and the list of potential 
damages relevant to each claim, they are left to puzzle over how to match 
 
98  RAJI (CIVIL) 3d, supra note 55, Preliminary 4, at 6; id. Standard 6, at 21. 
99  Id. Preliminary 2, at 4; id. Standard 2, at 17. 
100  The only mention of jurors’ prior experiences during formal court proceedings occurred during 
voir dire. 
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the claims with the appropriate damages. When two instructions use similar 
language but relate to different concepts (e.g., how to treat a corporate 
defendant in general as opposed to the special obligations a corporation 
may have), failure to explicitly address the difference leaves room for 
misunderstanding. Many of these structural problems that caused conflict 
and confusion could have been avoided by showing the jurors how the 
pieces of the instructions related to one another. Instead, the jurors 
frequently spent substantial time struggling with connections that they 
should not have made and trying to reconcile what appeared to be 
inconsistencies that were in fact interlocking pieces that actually fit 
together. 
4. Omission Errors.—The third category of error is the omission 
error. Omission errors arise because jurors bring expectations and 
preconceptions to the jury box. They actively search for ways to make sense 
of events about which they are told, consciously or unconsciously filling in 
blanks and resolving ambiguities to produce a plausible account and arrive 
at what they understand to be a just verdict consistent with the evidence and 
instructions.101 Yet, despite this well-documented profile of the active juror, 
jury instructions do not recognize—or at least do not address—the 
possibility that jurors may find it necessary to fill in apparent gaps with 
their own understanding of what is legally relevant. Instead, instructions 
typically communicate with jurors on a “need-to-know” basis.102 The 
traditional approach is to avoid bringing up an issue that the jury should not 
be thinking about, in order to avoid the possibility that the instructions 
would introduce an irrelevant topic that would otherwise not enter a juror’s 
mind or be discussed during deliberations.103 This minimalist approach is 
akin to the approach taken by the Federal Rules of Evidence in excluding 
potentially prejudicial information that may inappropriately influence the 
jury, such as subsequent remedial measures.104 Blindfolding through 
exclusion may be a reasonable strategy when the blindfold is opaque, that 
 
101  See, e.g., W. LANCE BENNETT & MARTHA S. FELDMAN, RECONSTRUCTING REALITY IN THE 
COURTROOM (1981); Shari Seidman Diamond & Jonathan D. Casper, Blindfolding the Jury to Verdict 
Consequences: Damages, Experts, and the Civil Jury, 26 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 513, 557–58 (1992); 
Nancy Pennington & Reid Hastie, A Cognitive Theory of Juror Decision Making: The Story Model, 
13 CARDOZO L. REV. 519, 519 (1991). 
102  See, e.g., SUPREME COURT ADVISORY COMM. ON MODEL UTAH JURY INSTRUCTIONS—CIVIL, 
GUIDELINES FOR DRAFTING PLAIN-LANGUAGE JURY INSTRUCTIONS ¶ 16 (“Don’t instruct the jury about 
things they don’t need to know, such as evidentiary rules.”), available at http://www.utcourts.gov/
committees/muji/guideline summary.pdf. This report was included in the materials used to draft the 
Model Utah Jury Instructions, Second Edition, UTAH ST. CTS., http://www.utcourts.gov/resources/muji/
index.asp?page=civ&view=all_civ (last visited Sept. 7, 2012). 
103  See Leon Green, Blindfolding the Jury, 33 TEX. L. REV. 157, 157 (1954). 
104  E.g., FED. R. EVID. 407; see also Shari Seidman Diamond et al., Blindfolding the Jury, 52 LAW 
& CONTEMP. PROBS. 247, 249–50, 261–64 (1989) (discussing the justifications for and effects of 
“blindfolding” the jury as to certain information). 
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is, when the jurors are unlikely to make assumptions about the potentially 
prejudicial information.105 When personal experience and knowledge offer a 
peek under the blindfold, however, the silent, exclusionary approach is 
unlikely to be effective. The classic instance of such a topic is whether the 
parties had insurance, a legally irrelevant issue in determining damages that, 
as we show below, jurors in tort cases often spontaneously consider as they 
discuss compensation.106 
Other topics may be omitted from the jury instructions not through 
intentional omission, but because the instructions do not adequately 
anticipate all of the decisions that the jurors may face. For example, juries 
in Arizona are told that they may reach a verdict if six of the eight jurors 
agree and sign the verdict form.107 This leaves out a few details: What 
should the jury do if six members agree that the defendant is liable? Who 
deliberates on damages? Must the same six jurors agree on the damage 
amount, or is the juror bound by the liability determination of the six? The 
instructions are silent. 
Table 5 shows the basic types of omission errors and reveals that forty-
four of the fifty cases produced juror comments that reflected topics 
avoided—or at least not explicitly addressed—by the jury instructions. The 
omission errors occurred as the jurors dealt with four major issues: (1) the 
role of jurors who preferred a no-liability decision during deliberations on 
damages; (2) the appropriate way to assess damages, including legally 
acceptable sources and costs, appropriate goals, and the degree of the jury’s 
discretion in arriving at an award; (3) the boundaries of relevant evidence; 
and (4) procedural decisions the jury had to implement in reaching a 
verdict. In each instance, the failure of the instructions to cover the topic 
meant that during their deliberations, some jurors expressed an inaccurate 
view of the relevant legal standard. 
 
105  See Diamond et al., supra note 104, at 261–64; see also Shari Seidman Diamond & Neil 
Vidmar, Jury Room Ruminations on Forbidden Topics, 87 VA. L. REV. 1857, 1905 (2001) (“When the 
forbidden topic is unlikely to be raised spontaneously by the jury, it is an appropriate subject for 
blindfolding.”). 
106  See FED. R. EVID. 411 advisory committee’s note (“[K]nowledge of the presence or absence of 
liability insurance would induce juries to decide cases on improper grounds.”); Michael v. Cole, 595 
P.2d 995, 997–98 (Ariz. 1979) (en banc); 1 MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 201 (Kenneth S. Broun ed., 
6th ed. 2006). See also 4 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 920A(2) (1979), which describes the 
collateral source rule, which provides that “[p]ayments made to or benefits conferred on the injured 
party from other sources are not credited against the tortfeasor’s liability, although they cover all or a 
part of the harm for which the tortfeasor is liable.” The rule has been described as an “established 
exception to the general rule that damages in negligence actions must be compensatory.” 25 C.J.S. 
Damages § 172 (2002). For examples of juror comments on insurance, see infra Part IV.C.4.b. 
107  See, e.g., RAJI (CIVIL) 3d, supra note 55, Standard 15, at 30. 
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TABLE 5: OMISSION ERRORS 







Jurors in Damage 
Deliberations     12   (1.0%)      2 16.7%      10   (1.5%) 
Damages Issues 1170 (94.8%)    43 46.1%    631 (94.7%) 
             Source 578 (46.8%)      31 37.9%        359 (53.9%) 
      Costs 505 (40.9%)      34 52.3%       241 (36.2%) 
      Goals          44   (3.6%)      12 38.6%         27  (4.1%) 
Discretion          43   (3.5%)      12 90.7%          4   (0.6%) 
Relevance     41     (3.3%)    14 46.3%       22    (3.3%) 
Procedure     11     (0.9%)      7 72.7%         3    (0.5%) 
Total 1234 (100.0%)    44 46.0%    666 (100.0%) 
 
By far, the largest category involved damages, which accounted for 94.8% 
of the omission errors. The primary sources of these damages errors were 
comments about insurance and attorney’s fees. 
a. No-liability jurors in damage deliberations.—In Arizona, as 
in most other states, jurors in civil cases are not required to be unanimous in 
order to reach a verdict.108 As a result, a juror may be outvoted by a majority 
prepared to find the defendant liable. The law in Arizona is clear: every 
juror who votes on liability should participate in the determination of other 
issues, including damages.109 Thus, jurors in two of the Arizona cases made 
errors when they expressed doubt as to whether a juror who had voted 
against liability should participate in deliberations on damages. In the first 
case, the issue was resolved with a question to the judge after the presiding 
juror asked if the no-liability juror could go home while the rest of the jury 
discussed damages.110 In the second case, the other jurors decided to permit 
the juror to continue deliberating, although one juror was skeptical about 
that decision. During the damages discussion, the exchange between these 
 
108  See ARIZ. R. CIV. P. 49(a). Only eighteen states require unanimity in civil trials. Shari Seidman 
Diamond et al., Revisiting the Unanimity Requirement: The Behavior of the Non-Unanimous Civil Jury, 
100 NW. U. L. REV. 201, 203 (2006). 
109  Perkins v. Komarnyckyj, 834 P.2d 1260, 1263 (Ariz. 1992) (en banc) (“[J]urors who find 
themselves in a minority on one issue may not withdraw or be excluded from consideration of the other 
issues in the case.”); accord Gorski v. J. C. Penney Co., 442 P.2d 851, 853–54 (Ariz. 1968); Hall v. 
Delvat, 389 P.2d 692, 696 (Ariz. 1964). Arizona is not unusual in this position. See, e.g., Schabe v. 
Hampton Bays Union Free Sch. Dist., 480 N.Y.S.2d 328, 335 (App. Div. 1984); Ralston v. Stump, 62 
N.E.2d 293, 294‒95 (Ohio Ct. App. 1944); Tex. Gen. Indem. Co. v. Watson, 656 S.W.2d 612, 615 (Tex. 
App. 1983). 
110  In fact, the bailiff, and not the judge, accurately (albeit inappropriately) answered the question. 
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two jurors became quite heated as the juror who had opposed liability 
argued for a lower award and the previously skeptical juror attributed that 
position to the juror’s earlier opposition to any award. In the end, the vote 
of the juror who had opposed liability was not needed for the group to reach 
a verdict and she did not sign the verdict form. 
This issue of participation in damage discussions could only have 
arisen in the six cases in which one or two jurors opposed a finding of 
liability when the jury moved on to consider damages. Decisions on 
liability and damages are legally independent so that once the jury has 
determined that a defendant’s negligence caused some damage to the 
plaintiff, the total amount of damages the plaintiff suffered should be 
unaffected by the percentage of the defendant’s fault. Nonetheless, these 
cases suggest some spillover from one decision to the other.111 We have just 
described the two cases in which some members of the jury questioned the 
continuing participation of the no-liability jurors. In the remaining four 
cases, no juror raised a question about including all jurors in the 
determination of damages. In all of these four cases, however, the jurors 
who opposed liability argued for lower awards than at least some other 
members who favored liability. In two of the cases, the jurors opposing 
liability did not sign the verdict form. In the remaining two cases, a 
unanimous verdict was reached with the no-liability jurors appearing to 
succeed in limiting the award. It is unclear whether the deliberations were 
affected by the lack of clarity about the appropriate role of no-liability 
jurors in damage discussions, but ambiguity on this point is an unnecessary 
product of the failure to instruct jurors on the legal standard that mandates 
participation of all jurors at every stage of deliberations. 
b. Damages.—The jury instructions in any civil case provide 
jurors with a list of damage categories that the jury may consider if it 
decides to make an award.112 Notably absent from the list is any mention of 
how those damages will be paid, which is a practical concern for the parties, 
but legally irrelevant to the jury’s charge of assessing reasonable damages 
 
111  This spillover between liability and damages is sometimes referred to as fusion. See EDIE 
GREENE & BRIAN H. BORNSTEIN, Characterizing Jury Damage Awards, in DETERMINING DAMAGES: 
THE PSYCHOLOGY OF JURY AWARDS 29, 41 (2003). Spillover from damages to liability judgments, 
attributed to the hindsight bias, occurs when jurors use damage information to judge the likely 
negligence of the defendant’s actions. See, e.g., Kim A. Kamin & Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Ex Post ≠ Ex 
Ante: Determining Liability in Hindsight, 19 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 89 (1995). The opposite path for 
fusion, when liability judgments influence damage estimates, is less well-established. While some 
studies have found that jurors consider defendant responsibility in calculating compensatory damages, 
see, e.g., James K. Hammitt et al., Tort Standards and Jury Decisions, 14 J. LEGAL STUD. 751, 756‒58 
(1985), others have not, see, e.g., Corinne Cather et al., Plaintiff Injury and Defendant Reprehensibility: 
Implications for Compensatory and Punitive Damage Awards, 20 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 189 (1996). 
112  See RAJI (CIVIL) 3d, supra note 55, Personal Injury Damages 1, at 112. See supra note 86 for 
the full text of the instruction. 
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without regard to who will pay.113 Similarly absent from the list are the 
plaintiff’s costs of pursuing the lawsuit—including attorney’s fees, court 
costs, and expert fees—which are also legally irrelevant, but nonetheless 
have implications for the ability of the damage award to fully compensate 
the plaintiff.114 The jury, or at least some of its members, is likely to 
consider one or more of these topics in evaluating what fair compensation 
will be. Currently, they do so without guidance from the court, unless the 
jurors decide to ask the judge a question about insurance or about potential 
costs, such as attorney’s fees or taxation of the award, a question the judge 
does not always answer.115 But even if they do not ask such questions, jurors 
come to the court with experiences that have primed them to think about 
these topics. 
(1) Source: insurance.—Jurors typically understand from 
their own experience that many motorists and others are insured. As a 
result, although jury instructions have traditionally avoided any mention of 
insurance, jurors make assumptions about the likely insurance status of the 
parties and draw conclusions about the likely behavior of the insurance 
companies. These assumptions and conclusions vary depending on the 
juror’s experience and knowledge of insurance. Consider the following 
examples from three different cases: 
CASE 1: 
JUROR #8: Well, insurance normally takes the tab on the car. 
[And from the same jury]: 
JUROR #1: Insurance companies give you ten physical therapy treatments  
   at the most. Ten, twelve at the very most. And that’s what?  
   Maybe a month of treatment? 
 
 
113  Evidence that a person carries liability insurance is generally excluded unless it is offered to 
“prov[e] a witness’s bias or prejudice or prov[e] agency, ownership, or control.” FED. R. EVID. 411. 
114  See Thomas D. Rowe, Jr., The Legal Theory of Attorney Fee Shifting: A Critical Overview, 
1982 DUKE L.J. 651, 651. 
115  Of the fifty-two questions that juries submitted to the judge during deliberations, eight 
concerned insurance, three were about attorney’s fees, and six were about other costs. In response to 
fifteen of these seventeen questions, the judge explicitly instructed the jury not to consider the issue. An 
additional twenty-five questions on these topics were submitted during trial, twenty-three of them about 
insurance. In response to ten of these questions, the judge explicitly instructed the jury not to consider 
the issue and the judge gave no response at all to the remaining questions. 
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CASE 2: 
JUROR #2: Um, we know it’s not going to come out of the defendant’s  
   pocket or there wouldn’t have been any, there wouldn’t have  
   been a trial. 
JUROR #6: [nodding] And he doesn’t have insurance, yeah. 
JUROR #2: There wouldn’t have been a trial. 
JUROR #3: Well, he might be liable for something over a certain amount. 
CASE 3: 
JUROR #5: Was he on insurance, or was that out of pocket? 
JUROR #2: We don’t know. 
JUROR #8: Don’t know. 
JUROR #4: I was wondering, too. 
JUROR #2: I guess he was out of school and he was working part time  
   jobs, so he might not’ve been covered by anything. 
JUROR #7: Of course, he was young enough to be covered by his mom and  
   dad still— 
JUROR #8: Depending on what kind of insurance they had. 
JUROR #7: —up until twenty-one years. 
JUROR #2: And, he was living at home. 
In Case 1, the jurors made claims about how insurance companies handle 
accident expenses, and their claims were not contradicted. In Cases 2 and 3, 
there was less agreement expressed by the jurors in the analysis of 
insurance. In Case 2, Juror #2 claimed that the insurance company would 
pay, but Juror #5 suggested that the defendant might have to pay something 
as well. In Case 3, the jurors made very different assumptions about the 
likelihood that the plaintiff had insurance. In thirty-one of the fifty cases, 
the jurors erred by talking about the parties’ insurance, frequently 
expressing the desire to avoid double-compensating a plaintiff who had 
already been reimbursed through insurance. Note that unlike jurors who 
made insurance comments that reflected resistance and a refusal to set aside 
a topic the jurors were aware they should not consider, the jurors making 
the insurance comments included in Table 5 gave no indication that they 
knew the subject of insurance was legally irrelevant. This ignorance is 
understandable. Unless a jury submitted a question to the judge concerning 
whether insurance was to be considered—which occurred in eleven of the 
cases116—the jury received no instruction that discussing insurance during 
deliberation was inappropriate.117 
 
116  In two additional cases the jury asked about insurance but did not receive a responsive answer. 
117  Mention of insurance was a legally inaccurate reference unless: (1) a juror mentioned an 
insurance company to identify where someone worked, (2) a juror drew on information presented at trial 
about the reason for a plaintiff’s behavior in obtaining medical help or in the selection of a particular 
doctor, or (3) a juror described personal experience with an accident and incidentally mentioned 
insurance (e.g., after describing the accident in detail, the juror said, “And my insurance picked it up, so 
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(2) Costs: attorney’s fees and other costs.—Jurors are 
not only concerned with evaluating the source of the damage award. They 
also know that litigants typically have expenses associated with the 
litigation that may effectively modify the amount of an award. They are 
usually aware that attorney’s fees in standard tort cases are contingency fees 
that will come out of the plaintiff’s award. Discussion of attorney’s fees 
occurred in thirty-four of the deliberations: 
CASE 1: 
JUROR #6: All right. Here’s what you can do. You can come up with an  
   amount . . . say the [medical] bills. Let’s get the bills paid,  
   okay— 
JUROR #3: [interrupting] Well, but we’re just . . . we’re just doing in three  
   categories [of damages] right now [pointing to the board]. If  
   we all come up with other, we’ll work on that— 
JUROR #8: [at the same time as Juror #3] We’re just [pointing to the 
 board] . . . just doing three right now. 
JUROR #6: And add like 20% or whatever for attorney’s fees. 
JUROR #8: Okay, but we can do that . . . . 
CASE 2: 
JUROR #5: Doesn’t some of that $[X] [go] for fees . . . for attorneys? 
JUROR #6: What about the attorney’s fees . . . . 
JUROR #2: The attorney’s— 
JUROR #4: They’ll come out of here. 
JUROR #5: He was acting like he [the plaintiff’s attorney] wasn’t going to  
   get paid. 
JUROR #6: No, no, no, no, wait. Attorney’s fees come off the top of that  
   $[X]. 
JUROR #4: And that will be . . . the minimum will be 35%. 
In Case 1, Juror #6 floated the idea of increasing the award to account for 
attorney’s fees, which the jury did not explicitly follow. In Case 2, at least 
three jurors engaged in a discussion of how much of the award will go for 
attorney’s fees, although they did not explicitly adjust their award to cover 
the fees. The only jury that explicitly added to its award to pay for 
attorney’s fees was the jury described earlier that reasonably interpreted the 
“services rendered” mentioned in the jury instructions on damages to 
include attorney’s fees.118 More commonly, jurors did not see any language 
in the instructions that told them how to deal with attorney’s fees, and the 
topic peppered their discussions about damages, reflecting their 
understanding of the fees as a significant cost that would effectively reduce 
 
I didn’t go to court.”). These references occurred in eighty-six comments. In a further 195 comments, a 
juror correctly and explicitly rejected insurance as relevant, usually in the context of correcting one of 
the 578 comprehension and 259 resistance errors about insurance by another juror. 
118  See supra note 73 and accompanying text. 
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the plaintiff’s award. The majority (75%) of the 505 comments in the 
category of cost errors concerned costs associated with attorney’s fees. In 
the remaining 126 comments (25%), jurors in 12 cases raised concerns 
about other irrelevant costs in addition to attorney’s fees that the plaintiff 
incurred before and during the trial, such as costs for experts and time lost 
from work while attending the trial. For example: 
CASE 1: 
JUROR #1: Because court costs are probably pretty expensive. 
JUROR #2: Well, because of Dr. X and the consult with Dr. Y. 
JUROR #1: That’s probably two grand. 
CASE 2: 
JUROR #1: They [the plaintiffs] would have been making money while  
   they were in the trial. They got, they lost [several] weeks. 
In Case 2, the jurors explicitly added a modest amount to their award 
(amounting to 1% of it) to cover the time the plaintiffs spent in court. 
Jurors in eight cases expressed concern about whether the award would 
be taxed. In one case the jurors explicitly reduced the amount they awarded 
the plaintiff for lost wages, reasoning that if he had earned the lost wages 
instead of recovering them at trial, he would have had to pay taxes on those 
earnings: 
JUROR #8: What about taking taxes out of the wages? He wouldn’t have  
   gotten that money anyway. 
JUROR #7: Oh, should we make it net? 
JUROR #5: Yes, let’s make it net. 
JUROR #8: Well, you know, because all typically that he lost was what he 
would have had to pay taxes on. 
JUROR #4: Right, right, absolutely. 
Like the jurors’ concerns about insurance, these cost errors reflect the 
jurors’ attention to items not mentioned in the instructions, but which jurors 
see as part of their task as they try to appropriately compensate the plaintiff. 
(3) Goals.—Jurors are instructed to fairly compensate the 
plaintiff for the injury negligently caused by the defendant,119 but they are 
not told that compensation is the only goal they should consider. They are 
not told that both deterrence and punishment are inappropriate goals to 
pursue. Without specific guidance limiting the only appropriate goal to 
compensation in the ordinary negligence cases (in which punitive damages 
are not at issue), jurors felt free to enlarge the range of goals they 
considered. In twelve cases (24% of all cases), at least one juror expressed 
an interest in “sending a message” or arriving at an award that would be “a 
 
119  See RAJI (CIVIL) 3d, supra note 55, Personal Injury Damages 1, at 112. 
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wakeup call.” Both plaintiffs and defendants were the subject of these 
comments: 
CASE 1: 
JUROR #6: [W]e should also send a message that people can’t go around 
suing just because— 
JUROR #3: Exactly. 
JUROR #6: —you get a little bumper. 
CASE 2: 
JUROR #4: This is just to give a signal to the [defendant] that you have to  
   be reasonably, uh, accountable— 
JUROR #3: Mm-hmm. 
JUROR #4: —you know, to your public . . . people coming and going. 
The remarks generally came from one or two jurors for a total of forty-four 
comments across the twelve cases. Other jurors explicitly corrected some of 
them (seventeen comments), as Juror #4 does below in a medical 
malpractice case: 
CASE 3: 
JUROR #8: On the other hand, you can look at this case as a way of  
   sending a message to Dr. X— 
JUROR #2: Mm-hmm. 
JUROR #8: —and the medical profession— 
JUROR #2: Exactly. 
JUROR #8: —that they need to— 
JUROR #4: Those are punitive damages. 
JUROR #8: —they need to watch— 
JUROR #4: And we’re not giving punitive damages. 
JUROR #8: —what they are doing. 
Although Jurors #2 and #8 may not have been deterred from their goal by 
Juror #4’s correction, they offered no further remarks on the topic during 
the deliberation. Yet this count may underestimate the tendency for jurors 
to see punishment as legitimate in a civil case in which it is not a legally 
relevant consideration. There is some evidence that the reprehensibility of a 
defendant’s behavior may increase awards.120 Thus, in the absence of an 
explicit instruction that punishment is an inappropriate goal, jurors may be 
more inclined to respond to irrelevancies, such as the defendant’s level of 
reprehensibility. 
(4) Discretion.—Deciding on damages is often described 
as the most difficult task for jurors because so little guidance is provided 
 
120  See GREENE & BORNSTEIN, supra note 111, at 136–37. 
  N O R T H W E S T E R N  U N I V E R S I T Y  L A W  R E V I E W 
 1584 
aside from the instruction to award reasonable compensation.121 Faced with 
plaintiff’s medical bills, jurors must determine what portion of these 
expenses was “reasonable.”122 Even with claims for lost wages, the jury 
must decide how much of the claimed amount the plaintiff actually would 
have earned if she had not been injured by the defendant. That assessment 
may require the jury to consider how many hours the plaintiff would have 
worked and even the amount she would have earned during the missing 
period (e.g., how much would she have earned as a commission-based 
worker?). The challenge is even greater when the jury must estimate future 
expenses—both medical expenses and any decreases in earning power or 
capacity in the future. In addition to physical injuries, jurors may be asked 
to consider damages for “pain, discomfort, suffering, disability, 
disfigurement, and anxiety already experienced, and reasonably probable to 
be experienced in the future as a result of the injury.”123 The plaintiff 
typically provides evidence and specific dollar amounts requested for 
medical expenses and lost earnings, past and future, often based on bills for 
expenses accrued and expert medical and economic testimony. Without any 
direct guidance from the court beyond the general instruction that what the 
attorneys say is not evidence, jurors sometimes are unsure how to treat the 
evidentiary guideposts124 the parties and their witnesses offer, and to know 
when they have discretion to either ignore or adjust them: 
CASE 1: 
JUROR #3: So the question is can we reduce the amount to Dr. X, or does  
   it have to be all or nothing? Right? 
JUROR #8: It has to be all or nothing. 
These types of misunderstandings occurred in twelve cases. On a few 
occasions, the jurors assumed there was a suggested range or guideline for 
damages, and they turned to the judge for help, learning (from the judge’s 
response) that it was up to them to determine the award. Nearly all of the 
forty-three misunderstandings involving jury discretion (90.7%) were 
corrected. 
 
121  See RAJI (CIVIL) 3d, supra note 55, Personal Injury Damages 1, at 112 (“If you find [any] 
defendant liable to plaintiff, you must then decide the full amount of money that will reasonably and 
fairly compensate plaintiff for each of the following elements of damages proved by the evidence to 
have resulted from the fault of [any] [defendant] [party] [person] . . . .”); see also Edith Greene & Brian 
Bornstein, Precious Little Guidance: Jury Instruction on Damage Awards, 6 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 
743, 746 (2000) (noting that jurors are instructed to compensate plaintiffs based on a number of 
components such as pain and suffering, but are not provided with definitions of the terms or instructions 
on balancing them). 
122  RAJI (CIVIL) 3d, supra note 55, Personal Injury Damages 1(3), at 112. 
123  Id. Personal Injury Damages 1(2), at 112. 
124  For a discussion of juror use of attorney recommendations as anchors, see Shari Seidman 
Diamond et al., Damage Anchors on Real Juries, 8 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 148 (2011). 
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c. Relevant evidence.—Courts instruct jurors to base their 
decisions on the evidence presented at trial and not to speak with trial 
participants if they encounter them outside of court during the trial. Jurors 
receive no explicit instruction about how they should handle any behavior 
they may observe or hear in the courtroom apart from the evidence 
presented from the witness stand or by the attorneys, or about what they 
may see and hear inadvertently outside the courtroom. In view of current 
legal controversy over whether a trier of fact should be permitted to 
consider the observed behavior of a party who is present in the courtroom 
while not testifying,125 we treated juror comments about “off-stage” 
behavior126 as errors only when the comments referred to nontestifying 
observers in the courtroom or to the behavior of trial participants outside 
the courtroom, both of which were clearly legally irrelevant. Across three 
cases, jurors made fourteen comments during deliberations about the 
behavior of nontestifying observers in the courtroom (e.g., “Did you see the 
man who was in the audience, sitting in the back who was with [the 
plaintiffs] at lunch yesterday?”), and about chance opportunities to view the 
behavior of the plaintiff outside the courtroom during the trial (e.g., “You 
know, he [the plaintiff] walked off the elevator just fine.”). The majority of 
the comments occurred in a case in which two jurors on separate occasions 
discussed behaviors they saw outside the courtroom—in the bathroom and 
on the street—where the plaintiff allegedly started limping when he 
recognized the juror. As information obtained outside of the trial, the jurors 
should not have mentioned those inadvertent observations during 
deliberations. As we have suggested elsewhere,127 jurors used these “off-
stage” observations to support their positions, but there is little evidence 
these observations affected verdicts in the cases in which they occurred. 
Irrelevant evidence presented at trial in these civil cases, even if it drew 
an objection sustained by the judge, was rarely substantially prejudicial to 
one of the parties. As a result, few irrelevant items presented during the trial 
attracted the attention of the jurors. In several instances, however, a juror 
cited a legally irrelevant piece of information presented at trial (e.g., the 
plaintiff “served our country” or has a family) as a basis for consideration 
on issues other than credibility. Some of these suggestions were rejected as 
irrelevant by other jurors, while others drew no reaction. 
 
125  See, e.g., United States v. Schuler, 813 F.2d 978, 982 (9th Cir. 1987) (finding that a witness’s 
nontestifying demeanor is not a form of evidence and its use in closing argument is improper). But cf. 
Morgan v. Dep’t of Fin. & Prof’l Regulation, 871 N.E.2d 178, 191 (Ill. App. Ct. 2007) (noting that an 
ALJ did not err in taking note of the testifying defendant’s demeanor while sitting in the courtroom). See 
also Mary R. Rose & Shari Seidman Diamond, Offstage Behavior: Real Jurors’ Scrutiny of Non-
Testimonial Conduct, 58 DEPAUL L. REV. 311 (2009) (discussing, in the context of proposals for fact 
finders to view testimony on video instead of in person, fact finder use of “offstage” litigant behavior). 
126  See Mary R. Rose et al., Goffman on the Jury: Real Jurors’ Attention to the “Offstage” of Trials, 
34 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 310, 313 (2010). 
127  Id. at 313, 318‒19. 
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d. Procedural errors.—Jurors receive some instruction on the 
procedures that they are expected to follow during the trial (e.g., not to 
speak with the attorneys, how to contact the bailiff for assistance, or not to 
discuss the case with friends or relatives)128 and how to handle their 
deliberations (e.g., choosing a foreperson to preside over deliberations),129 
but the deliberations revealed several omissions in these instructions. In one 
case, a juror worried that he was not supposed to take notes during closing 
arguments. Some jurors in a second case were concerned that if the jury 
decided two of the three claims and hung on the third, that the case would 
have to be completely retried. In a third case, a juror wondered if the jury 
was required to deliberate for a certain length of time. Most (72.7%) of 
these errors were explicitly corrected, and the remainder were ignored. 
They reveal that some standard procedures are unfamiliar to the laypersons 
who serve as jurors, a fact which unnecessarily causes the jurors concern 
and potentially distorts their behavior. 
In sum, comprehension errors take a variety of forms. This intensive 
analysis of when they occur and how juries do (and do not) address them 
provides the groundwork for understanding the opportunities for improved 
communication. In addition to these comprehension errors, however, we 
also identified areas that may signal resistance rather than 
miscomprehension. In the next section we discuss these “resistance” errors 
expressed by jurors who appeared to misstate or misapply the relevant law, 
not because they failed to understand an instruction, but because they 
refused to follow it. 
D. Resistance Errors 
Resistance errors, in contrast to comprehension errors, occur when a 
juror makes a legally inaccurate statement and there is explicit or contextual 
evidence that the juror is aware that the statement is wrong. For a juror’s 
error to qualify as a resistance error, the juror had to announce that he was 
not following the law, or there had to be strong evidence that the particular 
juror who made the error had received a clear instruction from the judge or 
his fellow jurors on the accurate version of the law, yet the juror continued 
to make the same error. That is, the 438 resistance errors, which constituted 
one in six instruction errors, occurred when a juror did not follow the 
appropriate legal standard and there was evidence that the juror was 
deviating intentionally from the law. In contrast, if a juror, although wrong, 
continued to maintain that he or she was correct, those inaccurate comments 
were treated as comprehension errors rather than resistance errors. For 
example, a juror did not want to attribute fault to the defendant from the 
actions of the defendant’s agent even after the other jurors pointed out that 
 
128  RAJI (CIVIL) 3d, supra note 55, Preliminary 7, at 9. 
129  Id. Standard 15, at 30. 
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the agency instruction indicated that the defendant had admitted the agency 
relationship for purpose of the claims. The juror responded: “I’m not sure if 
page ten [in the instructions] really means that [agent] is [defendant] in all 
respects [involving the agent’s actions at issue in the case].” We did not 
characterize this comment as resistance, although it is possible that the juror 
was being disingenuous and strategic, because the juror expressed the view 
that her position was correct, even suggesting that the jury send a question 
to the judge to get clarification.130 As indicated below, to constitute a 
resistance error a juror had to explicitly or implicitly reject an instruction, 
and not claim that the correction of the juror’s error was itself wrong.131 
A small number of the resistance errors were explicit and direct: the 
juror announced that he or she was disregarding the law and discussing a 
legally irrelevant topic or advancing an incorrect position on the law. Thus, 
a juror was explicitly defiant when the juror said, “I know we’re not 
supposed to speculate but . . . .” Other jurors showed similar awareness that 
they were considering “forbidden topics.” For example: 
CASE 1: 
JUROR #6: I probably shouldn’t say this at all, but here’s the part that  
   bothered me: this is why we all carry insurance. And we  
   obviously, one of his doctors said . . . she submits $[X] per  
   hour to his insurance carrier. Well, obviously we all know that  
   he probably didn’t pay, not for much of this, anyway. 
CASE 2: 
JUROR #3: Now I know we’re not supposed to consider this, but you do  
   realize the attorney’s taking a lot of this. 
In each of these instances of open defiance, the juror was directly 
acknowledging the legal rule but continuing to maintain a course directly at 
odds with it. These comments were made by twenty-four jurors who came 
from twenty different cases, and there were only thirty-one explicitly 
defiant comments overall. 
A more common form of resistance occurred when jurors persisted in 
making inaccurate comments about a legal issue after the judge clearly 
answered a direct question about the point at issue or after several other 
members of the jury explicitly pointed to a judicial instruction that 
contradicted the juror’s erroneous claim about the law. The bulk of the 
resistance comments, 308 (70%) of them, fell in this category. For example, 
after the judge explicitly responded to a juror question about insurance by 
telling the jurors to disregard the issue of insurance, a juror raised the 
 
130  In this example, the juror was ultimately persuaded that the instruction justified an agency-based 
liability, but this comment occurred during the deliberations before the juror reached that point. 
131  For the reliability analysis of this coding, see supra note 66. 
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question of the plaintiff’s insurance again and the following conversation 
ensued: 
JUROR #8: If she [the plaintiff] had [] insurance, the chiropractor wouldn’t  
   be covered because she had a preexisting condition if that’s  
   what she’s suing for. But I don’t know, I don’t know how  
   many people have insurance. I mean, I can’t . . . . 
JUROR #2: Well her primary physician indicates that she must belong to  
   an HMO or, at the time have belonged to a group insurance. 
JUROR #7: At [plaintiff’s place of employment] they have good insurance. 
Each of these three jurors showed resistance by disregarding the judge’s 
explicit admonition. In other cases, the jurors pointed to a specific judicial 
instruction (e.g., to ignore the plaintiff’s previous settlement for a worker’s 
compensation claim or with one of the original defendants in the case) and a 
juror continued to focus inaccurately on the topic. 
The third category of resistance error involved persistent 
nonacceptance of corrections from multiple jurors. Jurors made these 
ninety-nine (23%) legally inaccurate comments after at least two other 
jurors had corrected an inaccurate statement on this topic, thus implicitly 
resisting the correctly expressed position after being confronted 
unambiguously with it. For example: 
JUROR #2: Whatever comes out of this thing, her lawyer is going to  
   probably get anywhere from 25%–35%. 
JUROR #3: They get 33%. 
JUROR #2: Okay, her lawyer is going to get a third of whatever we tell  
   them. So, if in your mind . . . . 
JUROR #4: But see, now, the other thing is, if her lawyer is going to get  
   this, that shouldn’t be a factor into this. It’s her pain and  
   suffering. She can deal with this. 
JUROR #3: You’re not supposed to think about what the lawyer gets. 
JUROR #2: But still, you have to keep that in the back of your mind. 
Here, Juror #2 persists with the issue of attorney’s fees after Juror #4 and 
Juror #3 admonish the juror that it is inappropriate to consider the topic. 
These comments provided the weakest evidence of resistance. After all, the 
other jurors, unlike the judge issuing a direct and clear admonition, could be 
wrong. 
It may be that a few of what we called resistance errors in fact reflected 
such a serious misunderstanding of the instruction that the juror making—
and persisting in making—the error simply did not understand or notice the 
correction. We suspect, however, that there were few of these instances. 
When a juror did not explicitly announce that she was resisting, we only 
coded the error as a resistance error if it occurred following a very clear 
sign from the judge or other jurors that that the juror was making an error. 
106:1537 (2012) “Kettleful of Law” 
 1589
The vast majority of the 438 resistance comments concerned insurance 
(58.2%) or attorney’s fees (26.9%).132 In these comments, the jurors, 
contrary to legal doctrine,133 expressed the view that both insurance and fees 
are appropriate considerations despite the legal irrelevancy of both in 
determining damages. In articulating that view, the jurors thus expressed a 
modest disagreement with governing law, while accepting the overarching 
legal principle that a compensatory award should attempt to place plaintiffs 
as nearly as possible to their pre-accident or dispute positions. 
Apart from insurance and attorney’s fees, only a few other topics 
revealed jurors’ willingness to nullify the law, but they generally related 
similarly to the question of the sources or expenses that would affect full 
compensation. In a few remaining cases, individual jurors wanted to enlarge 
the category of relevant information in other ways. For example, in one case 
a juror insisted that it would be appropriate to find out whether one of the 
parties received a citation in the accident to determine who was at fault. In 
another case, the juror explicitly resisted the judge’s clear communication 
that a fact the jury found relevant was not relevant at all: “They [the judge] 
said it was irrelevant, but to me it was relevant as far as what kind of person 
he is: Do his children talk to him . . . ?” 
Two important points emerge from this analysis of the resistance 
errors. First, they are relatively infrequent compared to the much larger set 
of comprehension errors. Second, resistance errors tend to focus on 
insurance and attorney’s fees, where the law rules out consideration of these 
factors that jurors nonetheless find relevant to producing an appropriate 
compensatory award. 
E. Sustained Objections 
Jurors receive the bulk of their instructions on the law at the end of the 
trial, but they are warned in preliminary instructions that the judge will also 
make legal rulings during the course of the trial. The jurors are told in 
advance that when an objection is raised by one of the parties and the judge 
either sustains that objection or explicitly tells the jurors that a question or 
answer should be stricken from the record, the jurors should disregard that 
question, exhibit, or testimony.134 To evaluate how the jurors responded to 
 
132  An additional 0.9% concerned both. 
133  See sources cited supra note 106. 
134  The preliminary instruction from Arizona stated: 
 If an objection to a question is sustained, you must disregard the question and you must not 
guess what the answer to the question might have been. If an exhibit is offered into evidence and 
an objection to it is sustained, you must not consider that exhibit as evidence. If testimony is 
ordered stricken from the record, you must not consider that testimony for any purpose. 
 Do not concern yourselves with the reasons for my rulings on the admission of evidence. Do 
not regard those rulings as any indication from me of the credibility or weight you should give to 
any evidence that has been admitted. 
RAJI (CIVIL) 3d, supra note 55, Preliminary 3, at 5. 
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these sustained objections as a form of jury instruction, we sampled thirteen 
cases135 and examined each of the sustained objections in situations: (1) that 
might have involved disclosure of information to the jury that the judge’s 
instruction would have demanded that the jury not consider,136 (2) that 
garnered from the judge a specific admonition to strike, or (3) in which no 
reason was given by the attorney or judge. These criteria produced 234 
objections, which constituted two-thirds of the sustained objections in these 
cases.137 We examined each of the objections and the information revealed 
in the objectionable question or answer to determine whether any new 
information was revealed that under the governing law, the jury should not 
consider. We also checked to see whether the same information was 
revealed in unobjectionable questioning in another part of the trial. We then 
scrutinized the deliberation transcript to see whether the jurors discussed 
the objectionable material, and, if so, what they said. 
The majority of the sustained objections (79%) did not reveal any new 
or distinctive information. In these cases, either the objection prevented the 
witness from, for example, giving hearsay evidence, or the attorney was 
able to rephrase the question to avoid making it objectionable. The witness 
who answered the rephrased question, perhaps cued by the leading 
question, then provided the desired answer in an unobjectionable form. 
Objections to lack of foundation were typically addressed by providing a 
foundation, so that the question was then permitted. In other cases, another 
source provided the same information that the sustained objection had 
barred. 
In thirty-five of the instances, the sustained objection did reveal new 
information, but the jurors did not discuss the objectionable material. In the 
remaining fourteen instances, the jurors did talk about the topic that was the 
subject of the sustained objection. In two of these fourteen instances, the 
new information apparently had no influence, as when an attorney in a 
leading question on redirect suggested a legitimate reason for the failure of 
the witness to produce some financial records, drawing an immediate 
sustained objection. The jury unanimously rejected the credibility of the 
suggestion and, in fact, the credibility of the witness on all financial 
matters. Thus, only 12 of the 234 instances in this sample of sustained 
objections generated unique information that might have influenced the 
 
135  We selected these thirteen cases to proportionally represent the range of case types (five motor 
vehicle, one medical malpractice, six other tort, one contract) and frequency of objections from the cases 
in our sample, and also because we had trial transcripts for eleven of these cases. We identified the 
objections and rulings on the objections in the remaining two trials from the videotapes of those trials, 
rather than the transcripts. We then examined the deliberations in all thirteen cases. 
136  For example: argumentative, assumes facts not in evidence, counsel is testifying, lack of 
foundation, hearsay, lack of personal knowledge, leading, misstates evidence, irrelevant, speculation, 
prejudicial. 
137  Thus, we did not include sustained objections such as “asked and answered” because they were 
not based on objectionable information that had been or threatened to be revealed to the jury. 
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jury. In two of these remaining twelve instances, both from the same case, 
we were able to trace juror talk during deliberations directly to the material 
brought out that led to the sustained objection. In the discussions involving 
these two objections, the jurors explicitly referred to the fact that the 
sustained objection had occurred. Their conversation involved two 
objections made during the testimony of the same witness, as the 
questioning attorney attempted to introduce hearsay evidence that others at 
the scene had made the same identification that the testifying witness had 
made. When Juror #2 brought up the corroborating “witness” support 
during deliberations, two other jurors immediately responded: 
JUROR #1: How come [the absent witnesses] didn’t come and testify? 
JUROR #3: Wasn’t that deemed hearsay and stricken from the record  
   though? Wasn’t it deemed that we couldn’t use that because it  
   was all hearsay? 
Juror #2, who originally raised the issue, tried to defend his position: “In 
other words, we’re going to call [the absent witness] a liar?” Juror #6 joined 
the conversation, responding: “No, we’re not calling [the absent witness] a 
liar. We, we don’t have any testimony from [the absent witnesses]. How 
can you call them a liar? They haven’t testified. We have hearsay. 
Somebody said.” Although Juror #2 persisted in wanting to give weight to 
the absent nonwitness, the majority of the jurors explicitly rejected that 
view. 
The jurors did not explicitly talk about any other objection, and in no 
instance other than the one discussed above could their talk be traced 
directly to the forbidden material. In most of the other instances, sources 
other than the objectionable material may have produced the discussion 
(e.g., an objection was sustained because the attorney suggested a 
motivation and the jurors discussed that motivation, but the facts of the case 
would have suggested that motivation even if the attorney had not asked the 
question). There is no doubt that the deliberations only partially reveal what 
affects jury verdicts, and the material that emerged from the remaining 
twelve objectionable questions or answers may well have influenced the 
juries’ decisions. Nonetheless, this analysis provides no evidence that jurors 
regularly misused information revealed in spite of a sustained objection. 
What explains this minimal evidence of influential forbidden intrusions 
associated with sustained objections? The answer may stem from system 
controls on the attorneys, which are sometimes underappreciated. The 
classic version of influential intrusion that draws a sustained objection but 
is likely nonetheless to influence the juror appears in criminal trials when 
the prosecutor’s question produces evidence of the defendant’s criminal 
record (and the defendant has not taken the stand). The analogue in the civil 
case occurs when an attorney mentions or extracts information on 
insurance. What prevents attorneys from eliciting such potentially 
influential testimony beyond the fact that it may draw an objection that will 
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be sustained? One reason is that it may draw a damaging response from the 
judge. For example, it may influence discretionary rulings138 or lead to more 
direct action. In one of our cases, the judge responded when a plaintiff’s 
attorney asked a question involving insurance by instructing the jury that 
the defendant did not in fact have insurance.139 Further, in an extreme case, 
failing to abide by evidentiary rules can result in a mistrial, as it did in the 
initial trial of baseball legend Roger Clemens, in which the prosecution left 
a videotape running during a sidebar, but while the jury was present, that 
showed hearsay congressional testimony supporting the credibility of a key 
prosecution witness.140 It may also present fertile grounds for an appeal 
based on the claim that the inadmissible evidence tainted the jury.141 
Attorneys are generally urged to keep objections to a minimum, even 
when an objection would be legally warranted, out of concern that the 
objection itself will draw attention to the objectionable question or 
testimony.142 This advice not to take the chance of emphasizing 
objectionable questions or testimony has some empirical support143 and may 
reduce the frequency of objections, even when they are legally warranted. 
As we have seen, when objections did occur in these trials, the rulings on 
them were typically brief and gave little time for the jury to focus on the 
unanswered question or the partially interrupted response until the moment 
had passed. Moreover, the questions and responses that produced most 
sustained objections revealed little potentially prejudicial information to 
these juries. 
The result of this confluence of forces is that, unlike the Hollywood 
version of a trial in which an attorney asks a question that dramatically 
 
138  Our thanks to Professor Robert Burns for this observation. Interview with Robert Burns, 
Professor of Law, Nw. Univ. Sch. of Law (Mar. 10, 2012). 
139  In another trial not included in the thirteen sampled for the detailed analysis discussed in this 
section, a similar event occurred, and the defense attorney requested a mistrial. The judge responded by 
immediately giving an instruction in which he reminded the jurors that the plaintiff had mentioned that 
the defendants may have had insurance and instructed them to ignore that testimony. The jurors in this 
case did talk about insurance, the majority of their references contradicting the judge’s instruction. The 
primary contested issue in the case was how much damage, if any, was caused by the accident. The 
jurors were skeptical about the extent of the injury, and it is unclear whether the jury discussion of 
insurance affected the modest award. 
140  Richard A. Serrano, Clemens Trial Gets Quick Hook: Jury Is Allowed to View Statements on a 
Witness’ Credibility, Leading to a Mistrial, L.A. TIMES, July 15, 2011, at C1. 
141  See Edward J. Imwinkelried, Poetic Justice in Punishing the Evidentiary Misdeed of Knowingly 
Proffering Inadmissible Evidence, 7 INT’L COMMENT. ON EVIDENCE 1, 1‒2 (2009), available at http://
www.degruyter.com/view/j/ice.2009.7.1/ice.2009.7.1.1089/ice.2009.7.1.1089.xml?format=INT. 
142  Cf. THOMAS A. MAUET, FUNDAMENTALS OF TRIAL TECHNIQUES 336 (3d ed. 1992) (“Unless 
you are reasonably sure that the answer to a question will hurt your case, it is usually better not to 
object.”). 
143  See Nancy Steblay et al., The Impact on Juror Verdicts of Judicial Instruction to Disregard 
Inadmissible Evidence: A Meta-Analysis, 30 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 469, 486‒87 (2006) (“[The] 
[o]verruling of an objection is likely to accentuate the importance of that evidence and its impact.”). 
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reveals damning inadmissible evidence and opposing counsel immediately 
and loudly objects, these ordinary civil trials rarely extracted potentially 
influential prejudicial evidence highlighted by objections. Moreover, our 
close study of the deliberations in the wake of sustained objections showed 
no evidence suggesting that jurors resisted the judicial admonitions that 
were offered in this context. In the end, instructions on the law delivered by 
the judge through sustained objections did not appear to influence jury 
deliberations. 
F. Consequences of Comprehension and Resistance Errors 
All comprehension and resistance errors conflict with the legal 
system’s obligation to adequately instruct juries and the jury’s legal duty to 
follow the law. Although jurors made remarkably few errors in talking 
about the law during these deliberations, we identified seven cases in which 
a general misunderstanding on the part of the jury explicitly affected the 
jury’s damage award and no case in which resistance explicitly influenced a 
verdict on either liability or damages. The first damage award influenced by 
jury error was the result of a language error, two awards were influenced by 
omission errors, and four awards were affected by the same structural error. 
In the first case, the misunderstanding arose from a palpable failure to 
communicate: not only did the jurors not understand that the phrase in the 
instructions “services rendered” referred only to medical services (and not 
to attorney services), but in addition, the legal system failed to provide them 
with reasonable assistance; in response to their question, they received no 
clarification from the judge, who simply redirected them to the page listing 
damage categories that they had already been trying to follow. In two other 
cases, jurors made modest adjustments in their awards based on legally 
irrelevant criteria that were not mentioned in the jury instructions. In one 
case, the jury raised an award to account for the time the plaintiffs spent in 
court, and in the other, the jury reduced an award for lost wages to account 
for the taxes the plaintiff would have had to pay had he worked to earn the 
money. In all three of these cases, an explicit instruction ruling out 
attorney’s fees, taxes, and time in court as considerations in determining 
damages would have corrected any misunderstanding as to what the law 
prescribes. Of course, a clearer instruction may not have deterred the jurors 
from adjusting their awards to consider these factors, but in the absence of 
such an instruction, it is a mistake to attribute lack of compliance to 
misbehavior by the jury.144 
 
144  In 10 other cases, some jurors understood that attorney’s fees were an illegitimate factor to 
consider but nonetheless persisted in discussing how the attorney’s fees would affect what the plaintiff 
recovered. In 3 of those cases, a majority of the jurors participated in the conversation, producing a total 
of 102 resistance errors. In all 3 cases, they bemoaned the fact that an undeserving plaintiff’s attorney 
might recover more than he deserved. A total of 20 resistance comments occurred across the remaining 
7 cases. In none of these 10 cases was it clear that the attorney’s fees influenced the damage award. 
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The structural errors that arose in four other cases shaped the damages 
the jury awarded when the jurors adjusted their awards in comparative fault 
cases to ensure that the plaintiff would recover reasonable medical costs. 
These juries gave no indication that they saw this approach as inconsistent 
with the legal instruction to allocate the percentage of total damages 
between the two parties on the basis of percentage of fault. No juror on any 
of these juries objected to the way the jury arrived at the percentage of fault 
or the assessment of damages. Here, further work is needed to determine 
how, and perhaps whether, to address these structural errors. It is significant 
that in one of the four cases, the decision to give full medical expenses 
despite allocating partial fault to the plaintiff was in part a compromise 
between a few jurors, who wanted to make an award for pain and suffering, 
and the majority, who objected to any award for pain and suffering. 
The history of comparative damages is instructive on the conflicts 
about the appropriate relationship between decisions on liability and 
damages. Before comparative fault emerged as the dominant legal regime 
for torts, some legal scholars advocated the use of bifurcated trials that 
would separate considerations of liability and damages.145 The comparative 
fault cases add an additional context in which questions about the ability to 
separate liability and damage considerations emerge.146 When juries fail to 
keep liability and damage assessments separate, it may reflect 
comprehension problems. Alternatively, or in addition, the jurors in these 
cases may be revealing a preferred theory of damages that the law as 
currently constructed does not recognize: that injured plaintiffs should be 
entitled to recover some of the costs associated with injuries received that 
were caused by the negligence of a defendant (e.g., medical expenses, but 
not pain and suffering), even if the plaintiff contributed to the injuries as 
well. In any event, the deliberations of these juries suggest that instructions 
under the current legal rules have only inconsistently led jurors to separate 
considerations of liability and damages in comparative fault cases. 
V. ADDRESSING LEGAL ERRORS 
Most of the juror talk about legal issues that we observed during these 
deliberations showed the jurors grappling successfully with their jury 
instructions—79% of comments stating or applying the law accurately 
reflected the instructions and less than 9% of the comments about 
instructions were errors that remained uncorrected. This close examination 
of error in deliberations suggests that jury instructions are largely, although 
not always, successful in helping jurors understand what they need to know 
about the law they are being asked to apply. The results show far better 
performance than what is typically reported in surveys and in the 
 
145  See supra note 89. 
146  See supra note 89 and accompanying text. 
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experimental literature.147 What explains this inconsistency? One possibility 
is that jurors faced with applying instructions during deliberations are able 
to assist one another in ways not captured on post-deliberation questions or 
in studies of individual respondents. Another possibility is that the 
availability of written copies of the instructions for each individual juror 
bolsters comprehension. As we saw, the Arizona jurors frequently consulted 
their written instructions to directly check their understanding of the legal 
standards they were being asked to apply.148 In some prior research showing 
no effects of deliberation on post-deliberation comprehension measures, the 
jurors did not receive even one copy of the instructions.149 
Finally, we might ask whether the jurors in Tucson were unusually 
competent. As other researchers have shown, comprehension of complex 
evidence increases with juror education.150 In fact, the educational 
distribution of the Tucson jurors in the Arizona Jury Project was 
remarkably similar to the distribution of jurors in a study conducted in a 
large urban state court in Cook County, Illinois, and in a second study 
conducted in a federal court in Connecticut151: 














Less than 4 years of high school   4.5%   6%   3.9%   3.8% 
High school graduate 22.7% 24% 20.7% 23.5% 
Some college 40.2% 28% 28.4% 26.8% 
College degree or greater 32.6% 41% 47.0% 46.0% 
 
In light of this evidence that the Arizona jurors are not atypically highly 
educated and that the report card from these real jury deliberations shows 
far better marks than the prior empirical work would have predicted, we 
might be tempted to dismiss the concerns frequently raised about opaque 
jury instructions152 and ignorant jurors.153 Nonetheless, the jurors we studied 
 
147  See supra notes 19–21. 
148  See supra notes 56–57 and accompanying text. 
149  See, e.g., Ellsworth, supra note 21. 
150  See Valerie P. Hans et al., Science in the Jury Box: Jurors’ Comprehension of Mitochondrial 
DNA Evidence, 35 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 60, 67 (2011). 
151  See Diamond & Casper, supra note 101, at 529 n.15; Hillel Y. Levin & John W. Emerson, Is 
There a Bias Against Education in the Jury Selection Process?, 38 CONN. L. REV. 325, 336–38 (2006). 
152  E.g., Ellsworth & Reifman, supra note 6, at 540. 
153  E.g., FRANKLIN STRIER, RECONSTRUCTING JUSTICE: AN AGENDA FOR TRIAL REFORM 140 
(1994). 
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did not always succeed in understanding and correctly applying their 
instructions on the law, and we found evidence that the errors affected 
damage awards in several cases. Moreover, because we could only listen to 
the jurors talk and could not hear their unexpressed errors in thinking, our 
ability to learn about their misunderstandings may be incomplete. In 
addition, it was clear that the jurors often had to struggle to arrive at an 
accurate understanding of the law they were supposed to apply. Both their 
struggles and the public perception of a disconnection between jury 
decisionmaking and the law threaten the legitimacy of the jury as a 
trustworthy pillar of the justice system. Finally, although the trials we 
studied here are typical standard fare in state civil litigation, the instructions 
the jurors in these cases received were not nearly as complex as the 
instructions jurors face in some trials. For example, in a recent case in 
Illinois, former governor Rod Blagojevich was charged with twenty-four 
counts involving alleged attempted bribery, attempted extortion, and wire 
fraud, among other charges.154 At the end of the trial, the jury received more 
than one hundred pages of instructions, and the jurors reported that they 
spent the first several days of deliberations attempting to understand the 
instructions, including the relationship between the various charges.155 
Although this trial was more complicated than the trials in the Arizona 
Project and indeed involved an unusually complicated set of charges, the 
Arizona jurors who faced cases involving multiple claims were also 
challenged by the need to understand whether there was a relationship 
between them. 
Our sense is that the Arizona jurors in the ordinary set of civil trials we 
studied provide a window into the problems that jurors face more generally, 
revealing previously undiagnosed sources of error. Although the 
deliberations display generally effective performance by the jurors, the 
deliberations also reveal struggles and errors reflecting strains that need to 
be addressed. We begin the next section by embracing fully the goal of 
optimizing compliance with the current legal standards that jury instructions 
attempt to convey. Thus, we focus on potential remedies for 
miscommunication. At the end, however, we step back and consider the 
jury as a source rather than as a recipient of law, describing some ways that 
legal rules might change to reflect jury preferences not recognized in 
current legal doctrine. 
 
154  Monica Davey & Susan Saulny, For Blagojevich, a Guilty Verdict on 1 of 24 Counts, N.Y. 
TIMES, Aug. 18, 2010, at A1. 
155  Monica Davey & Susan Saulny, Jurors Fault Complexity of the Blagojevich Trial, N.Y. TIMES, 
Aug. 19, 2010, at A1 (“It was like, ‘Here’s a manual, go fly the space shuttle,’ Steve Wlodek, one of the 
jurors, said . . . .”). After the first jury hung on all but one of the twenty-four counts, Blagojevich was 
retried on seventeen of the charges and the second jury reached a unanimous verdict on fifteen of them. 
Monica Davey & Emma G. Fitzsimmons, Ex-Governor Found Guilty of Corruption: In Second Trial, 
Jurors Convict Blagojevich, N.Y. TIMES, June 28, 2011, at A1. 
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A. An Overview of Potential Remedies 
If we instructed jurors using plain English whenever possible and 
defined unfamiliar legal terms when use of those terms was unavoidable, 
the instruction process could eliminate many of the missteps associated 
with technical jargon and could remove up to one in four of the errors made 
by jurors in the Arizona Project. These linguistic problems are well-
documented and can be corrected, if not effortlessly, then at least with a 
modicum of effort. Some efforts have recently been made in this 
direction.156 Indeed, Arizona’s pattern jury instructions have been revised to 
encourage courts to replace the descriptions “plaintiff” and “defendant” 
with the names of the parties in order to avoid juror confusion.157 The errors 
that opaque instruction language causes do not stem from any inherent 
inability of the jury, from inconsistencies in the law, or from active 
resistance to legal directives, but merely from curable communication 
failures. But these wording traps are not the only, or even the most 
fundamental, reason why jurors may struggle unsuccessfully as they 
attempt conscientiously to apply the law. The Arizona jury deliberations 
revealed two more challenging sources of a serious disconnect with the 
law—as written—that a plain English focus will not solve. The following 
two other sources account for three out of four instruction errors: first, 
structural errors arising from the piecemeal construction of jury 
instructions, and second, omission errors arising from an unwillingness to 
confront the realities about what jurors know and expect. Together with the 
evidence of a few pockets of active resistance to the law, these other 
sources of error reveal why more is required than a plain English movement 
in jury instructions if the goal is both to provide clear guidance and to 
generate compliance. They also reveal the law’s inconsistencies and 
ambivalences, suggesting the possibility that jurors—and not legal 
doctrine—may occasionally have the better of the argument when the two 
are at odds. 
 
156  See Peter M. Tiersma, Communicating with Juries: How to Draft More Understandable 
Instructions, 10 SCRIBES J. LEGAL WRITING 1 (2006) (proposing basic rules for effective communication 
with jurors). The author, Peter Tiersma, is a linguist who recently helped rewrite the California Pattern 
Jury Instructions. Id. at 2. For examples of empirical studies demonstrating that plain English revisions 
to jury instructions can improve comprehension, see Diamond & Levi, supra note 33; V. Gordon Rose 
& James R.P. Ogloff, Evaluating the Comprehensibility of Jury Instructions: A Method and an Example, 
25 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 409, 419–20 (2001) (finding comparable results using a different experimental 
design); and see also Nancy S. Marder, Bringing Jury Instructions into the Twenty-First Century, 
81 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 449, 486–87 (2006) (advocating having former jurors serve on pattern jury 
instruction committees). 
157  This change might have eliminated the sixteen technical language errors that jurors made in 
three of our cases due to confusion about the identity of parties mentioned in the instructions. See 
discussion supra Part IV.C.2.b. 
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B. Addressing Structural Errors 
Jury instructions are written in parts.158 When the court delivers the set 
of approved instructions, each part has been vetted for legal accuracy by the 
judge and the parties, but the set as a whole typically has been put together 
like a patchwork quilt with pieces from the defense, pieces from the 
plaintiff, and pieces from the judge. The jury receives the result and then 
tries to fit the pieces together. Although each instruction may be intelligible 
on its own, the jury is given little or no advice on how the pieces should 
work together. How could we ensure that jurors understand how the 
instructions fit together? The only way would be for the authors of jury 
instructions to analyze and evaluate sources of potential conflict between 
pieces, attend to the order in which they are to be presented, and offer the 
jury explicit guidance on the relationship or non-relationship between the 
two parts of the instructions. Many of these changes would not require 
drastic action. They might, for example, involve embedding a definition 
within the instruction, rather than presenting the definition by itself on a 
separate page. Other changes would require more; for example, instructions 
might be included that explicitly point out differences between instructions 
that might appear to be related. This more holistic approach to writing 
instructions, whether by a pattern jury instructions committee or by the 
attorneys and trial judge in the case being tried, means that the instructions 
are not ready when all of the relevant pieces are selected, but only after the 
sum of the parts is considered as a whole. 
An additional byproduct of this holistic approach is that it would in 
some cases reveal inconsistencies in the law that are worthy of attention, 
identifying instances when instructions are not clear because the legal 
doctrine itself is ambiguous. For example, how far is a juror permitted to go 
in drawing on personal experience, as jurors regularly do? What if the juror 
has relevant occupational expertise? As one juror with medical expertise 
observed: 
 
158  See supra note 80. 
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JUROR #7: That’s another thing, one of the things I was listening really  
   carefully . . . they didn’t say . . . . They said two things that  
   kind of confused me. They said you can’t use any evidence that  
   wasn’t introduced. 
JUROR #6: Right. 
JUROR #7: Now I can sit here and think a lot about the reasons she would  
   have a lot of the symptomatology she does . . . that they never  
   said, ‘What about this? What about this [counts on fingers] you  
   know.’ Now, can we consider those things? 
We did not consider this musing to be an error. Jurisdictions differ in their 
evaluation of what would be permissible in this case.159 Even judges and 
experienced attorneys in the same jurisdiction have varying views on the 
appropriate use of such juror expertise. We have presented vignettes to 
judges and experienced attorneys, describing, for example, a juror with a 
medical background who convinced her fellow jurors in a tort suit that the 
medical expert who testified for the plaintiff was incorrect.160 The expert 
claimed that the plaintiff’s injury made him more susceptible to the viral 
infection he contracted six months after the accident.161 We asked judges 
and practicing attorneys whether the juror had behaved appropriately or 
inappropriately. Even judges from the same jurisdiction were divided on the 
propriety of the juror’s behavior. The issue here is thus not merely a matter 
of clarifying what the law demands, but rather of determining what that 
demand is. 
C. Addressing Omission Errors 
Omission errors should come as no surprise once we correct the 
misleading picture of jurors as blank slates and acknowledge that they do, 
as they must, fill in gaps to make sense of what they see and hear in the 
courtroom.162 All comprehension is inherently a constructive process, and 
we regularly rely on our prior experiences to enable us to understand and 
interpret what is left unspecified. Often, we arrive at an accurate 
understanding that is generally shared. For example, we understand the 
sentence, “The policeman held up his hand and stopped the car.”163 We 
 
159  See Shari Seidman Diamond et al., Embedded Experts on Real Juries (Feb. 8, 2012) 
(unpublished manuscript) (on file with the authors). 
160  Id. 
161  Id. 
162  Cognitive psychologists refer to cognitive structures of organized prior knowledge, abstracted 
from experience with specific instances, as cognitive schemas. They can be acquired directly or 
indirectly, and they guide both the processing of new information and the retrieval of stored information. 
See, e.g., SUSAN T. FISKE & SHELLEY E. TAYLOR, SOCIAL COGNITION (2d ed. 1991). 
163  This classic example comes from Nancy Pennington & Reid Hastie, The Story Model for Juror 
Decision Making, in INSIDE THE JUROR: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF JUROR DECISION MAKING 192, 195 (Reid 
Hastie ed., 1993). 
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easily infer from our prior knowledge about police and traffic that the 
officer signaled the driver to come to a stop and did not put his hand on the 
car to forcefully prevent it from moving. Other inferences are more 
difficult, vary across individuals, and may fill gaps with unintended or 
inaccurate content. Our findings demonstrate that litigation expenses and 
insurance are in this category. 
Jurors in personal injury cases in Arizona are instructed: 
 If you find [any] defendant liable to plaintiff, you must then decide the full 
amount of money that will reasonably and fairly compensate plaintiff for each 
of the following elements of damages proved by the evidence to have resulted 
from the fault of [any] [defendant] [party] [person]: 
 (1) The nature, extent, and duration of the injury. 
 (2) The pain, discomfort, suffering, disability, disfigurement, and anxiety  
already experienced, and reasonably probable to be experienced in the 
future as a result of the injury. 
 (3) Reasonable expenses of the necessary medical care, treatment, and  
services rendered, and reasonably probable to be incurred in the future. 
 (4) Lost earnings to date, and any decrease in earning power or capacity in  
the future. 
 (5) Loss of love, care, affection, companionship, and other pleasures of the  
[marital][family] relationship.164 
In all of the thirty-two Arizona cases in which the jurors found in favor 
of the plaintiff, the jurors referred to this list as they deliberated on 
damages. They generally addressed each category, although they were 
sometimes unclear what the category “nature, extent, and duration of the 
injury” covered, and they primarily focused on damage elements two 
through five (e.g., medical expenses, lost earnings). In addition, however, 
jurors often expressed the view that this approach would be incomplete in 
determining the appropriate compensation. In trying to reasonably and 
fairly compensate the plaintiff, the jurors recognized that other factors 
would influence what the plaintiff received, including insurance, attorney’s 
fees, and occasionally taxes.165 Currently, the legal system generally deals 
 
164  RAJI (CIVIL) 3d, supra note 55, Personal Injury Damages 1, at 112. The instruction calls for a 
modification of this list to avoid elements that are inapplicable (e.g., future expenses if none are 
claimed) or cumulative, and notes that some unlisted elements may be applicable and that therefore 
customization may be required. Id. No additional elements were added to any of the personal injury 
instructions for cases in the Arizona Project. A sixth element—“Loss of enjoyment of life, that is, the 
participation in life’s activities to the quality and extent normally enjoyed before the injury.”—was 
added to the list since the Arizona Project data were collected. STATE BAR OF ARIZ., REVISED ARIZONA 
JURY INSTRUCTIONS (CIVIL) 108 (4th ed. 2005) [hereinafter RAJI (CIVIL) 4TH]. No jury in the Arizona 
Project received this additional instruction. 
165  Jurors, in effectively enlarging the legally relevant criteria supporting a damages award, reflect a 
distinction that attorneys make in discussing settlement values: both the jurors and the attorneys are 
concerned with “new money”—that is, with what the plaintiff will actually receive. Tom Baker, Blood 
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with these unlisted factors simply by ignoring them because they are all 
legally irrelevant. If the legal system really intends to have jurors ignore 
these factors,166 it seems clear that failing to speak to the jurors about them 
is a failing strategy. Although it is difficult to trace juror comments on these 
topics directly to case outcomes in all instances, juries in at least three cases 
adjusted their awards to reflect items not on the list of relevant damage 
categories. In other cases, individual jurors said they were increasing their 
award to cover attorney’s fees or decreasing their award on the assumption 
that the plaintiff had already recovered some or all expenses from 
insurance. The topics of insurance and attorney’s fees come up so 
frequently during deliberations that a more direct approach is required.167 
We cannot escape, so we should not ignore, the fact that modern jurors are 
aware of the realities of litigation costs and sources of reimbursement.168 By 
leaving these topics unaddressed, we effectively invite the unwarranted 
disparity in decisions that can arise as some juries adjust their awards to 
reflect these elements and others do not. Even if we are hesitant to address 
each potential litigant cost or source of reimbursement separately, on the 
grounds that most juries do not consider some of them (e.g., taxes or 
witness costs), a meta-instruction could warn jurors that if any item does 
not appear on the list they receive from the judge, the jurors should not 
include it in any award they make. 
D. Addressing Resistance Errors 
Juries are sometimes criticized for refusing to follow the law they are 
given, yet we saw little evidence of explicit resistance.169 It may be that 
when jurors intentionally nullify the law, they do so primarily in criminal 
cases, or that they express their resistance silently. A juror, for example, 
might not believe that a defendant was negligent but may decide that the 
defendant should pay the plaintiff’s damages for some other reason. Aware 
that the law requires negligence, such a juror might not overtly 
acknowledge that he was ignoring the negligence requirement. The 
deliberations did reveal a few complaints about the strictures of the law by 
an occasional juror who voiced some dissatisfaction with having to follow 
 
Money, New Money, and the Moral Economy of Tort Law in Action, 35 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 275, 301‒02 
(2001). 
166  Fifty years ago, Harry Kalven, Jr. suggested that the legal system might actually be ambivalent 
about jury considerations of attorney’s fees: “Since we cannot decide what we want to do about fees as 
damages, we are happy to let the whole troublesome issue go to the jury.” Harry Kalven, Jr., The Dignity 
of the Civil Jury, 50 VA. L. REV. 1055, 1070 (1964). 
167  Diamond & Vidmar, supra note 105, at 1907 (“Ignoring [jurors’] attention to the [forbidden] 
issue[s] is tantamount to behaving like an ostrich.”). 
168  See discussion supra Parts IV.C.4.b(1)–(2). 
169  See supra Part IV.D. 
  N O R T H W E S T E R N  U N I V E R S I T Y  L A W  R E V I E W 
 1602 
it. For example, several jurors expressed discomfort with the vicarious 
liability arising from agency law. Here, Juror #3 explains: 
I don’t think that’s right, but it’s the law. It’s just like the sexual harassment 
thing. If your supervisor sexually harasses you, you can sue the company even 
though it was the guy, and it wasn’t the company, that was groping you, you 
know, it was the guy. But the company’s still liable and it’s the law, and it 
probably isn’t good, right, or fair but we have to follow what the law says. 
Insurance played a key role as a source of both resistance and 
comprehension errors, presenting the dilemma of how to address the 
insurance issue if comprehension is not the primary source of 
noncompliance for at least some jurors. The current legal practice of silence 
on the subject, or willingness to address it only when jurors explicitly ask a 
question about it, simply promotes inconsistency and undermines fairness. 
We have previously suggested that one remedy might be to explicitly 
instruct jurors in tort cases, when they are highly likely to assume that 
insurance is present, that insurance is legally irrelevant.170 We also 
advocated honestly telling them that there is no way they can accurately 
determine whether any party in the case has insurance coverage or, if one or 
both parties have it, how much insurance they have.171 Research is needed to 
determine whether this kind of acknowledged blindfolding can operate as a 
reasoned admonition,172 that is, as a “collaborative instruction.”173 A 
collaborative instruction treats jurors as partners in the enforcement of legal 
rules by including a reason-based explanation as to why a statute or other 
legal standard addressed a particular issue the way it did. This reasoned 
admonition goes beyond a simple admonition that merely demands that the 
jury accept a legal standard without further justification because it is the 
law.174 The notion is that if jurors are persuaded to accept the explanation, 
 
170  See Diamond & Vidmar, supra note 105, at 1909‒10. 
171  Id. 
172  See, e.g., Diamond & Casper, supra note 101, at 524. “The traditional remedy for the 
introduction of inadmissible evidence is to admonish the jury to ignore it.” Diamond & Vidmar, supra 
note 105, at 1907. 
173  See Diamond & Vidmar, supra note 105, at 1911. 
Arizona and several other states have recently introduced an instruction on the irrelevance of 
insurance, but none has given an explanation for the admonition to disregard beyond the bald assertion 
that insurance is not relevant; for example, “In reaching your verdict, you should not consider [or 
discuss] whether a party was or was not covered by insurance. Insurance or the lack of insurance has no 
bearing on whether or not a party was at fault, or the damages, if any, a party has suffered.” RAJI 
(CIVIL) 4TH, supra note 164, Standard 9, at 30 (citing Diamond & Vidmar, supra note 105, as a source, 
but modifying the instruction proposed in that article). Moreover, use of the instruction is generally 
discretionary: “Arizona Superior Court judges have differing views as to whether to use the insurance 
instruction just situationally or routinely.” Id. use note. Other states with instructions containing similar 
admonitions include California, JUDICIAL COUNCIL OF CALIFORNIA CIVIL JURY INSTRUCTIONS, CACI 
No. 105, at 15 (2012), Indiana, IND. JUDGES ASS’N, INDIANA MODEL CIVIL JURY INSTRUCTIONS No. 
533 (2011), and Virginia, 1 VIRGINIA MODEL JURY INSTRUCTIONS—CIVIL No. 9.015, at I-191 (1998). 
174  See Diamond & Vidmar, supra note 105, at 1909. 
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they will be more inclined—and better able—to set aside an issue that they 
initially find pertinent. We do not presume that such explanation-based 
instructions can control the use of evidence that appears not only useful, but 
central to answering key questions about witness credibility (e.g., criminal 
record),175 but for more peripheral issues, particularly those like insurance 
coverage that are likely to be the subject of general interest from jurors and 
are susceptible to widely varying assumptions, a direct explanation-based 
instruction may offer the most effective approach. 
Even more challenging is the resistance that emerges from juror 
awareness that the plaintiff will have to pay attorney’s fees. The evidence 
presented here of the ubiquitous nature of this concern, and the 
reasonableness of jurors’ sense that full compensation should cover the 
plaintiff’s costs in litigation, breathes new life into the arguments against 
the general application of the American rule that requires parties to bear 
their own litigation costs.176 Although there has been much debate about the 
relative merits of the American rule versus the English rule (which has the 
loser pay the winning party’s litigation costs, including attorney’s fees),177 
the potential impact on unwarranted disparity in jury awards has received 
little attention. 
E. Human Limits on Applying Legal Rules 
The errors we observed in these deliberations arose primarily because 
the instructions failed to tell the jurors what they needed to know. We 
expected to see, but did not find evidence of, another source of error that 
experimental studies have documented: the tendency of the law to on 
occasion ask jurors (and judges) to perform impossible mental gymnastics 
 
175  There is ample evidence that people may be unable to suppress thoughts even when they are 
highly motivated to do so and that unconscious or uncontrollable mental processing can influence 
judgments. See, e.g., Daniel M. Wegner, Ironic Processes of Mental Control, 101 PSYCHOL. REV. 34, 34 
(1994); Timothy D. Wilson & Nancy Brekke, Mental Contamination and Mental Correction: Unwanted 
Influences on Judgments and Evaluations, 116 PSYCHOL. BULL. 117, 117 (1994). Thus, both laypersons 
and judges may be influenced by inadmissible evidence they recognize as irrelevant and are motivated 
to disregard. See, e.g., Saul M. Kassin & Samuel R. Sommers, Inadmissible Testimony, Instructions to 
Disregard, and the Jury: Substantive Versus Procedural Considerations, 23 PERSONALITY & SOC. 
PSYCHOL. BULL. 1046, 1047‒49 (1997) (laypersons); Andrew J. Wistrich et al., Can Judges Ignore 
Inadmissible Information? The Difficulty of Deliberately Disregarding, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 1251, 
1288‒1324 (2005). 
176  For discussions of the current rule and the controversy surrounding it, see Howard Greenberger, 
The Cost of Justice: An American Problem, An English Solution, 9 VILL. L. REV. 400 (1964), and John 
F. Vargo, The American Rule on Attorney Fee Allocation: The Injured Person’s Access to Justice, 
42 AM. U. L. REV. 1567 (1993). 
177  E.g., John J. Donohue III, Commentary, Opting for the British Rule, or if Posner and Shavell 
Can’t Remember the Coase Theorem, Who Will?, 104 HARV. L. REV. 1093 (1991); Keith N. Hylton, Fee 
Shifting and Predictability of Law, 71 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 427 (1995). 
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that do not comport with human abilities.178 For example, there is 
convincing evidence that jurors cannot limit their use of a defendant’s 
criminal record, as the law requires, to judging credibility and not to 
influencing judgments of propensity.179 Yet courts regularly give a limiting 
instruction to do just that. Similarly, the Supreme Court in State Farm 
Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Campbell held that juries, when setting 
the amount of punitive damages, should be told that they can consider out-
of-state conduct by the defendant to judge the defendant’s reprehensibility, 
but not to set the amount of damages based on harm done to such 
nonparties.180 The rationale may be understandable, but using the evidence 
of injury to others appropriately probably demands superhuman capabilities 
that judges as well as jurors lack.181 
We have little doubt that limiting instructions impose demands that are 
likely to be difficult for jurors—and possibly judges182—to apply as the law 
directs. In those circumstances in which the legal rule asks for the 
application of a limiting instruction, solutions that will ensure that the 
legally mandated rule will be applied are also limited. As we and others 
have suggested elsewhere, admonitions, limiting or not, may be insufficient 
to eliminate the influence of evidence that a decisionmaker sees as highly 
relevant to arriving at an accurate verdict.183 Limiting instructions further 
tax the juror’s ability to follow the court’s direction by asking the juror to 
engage in the cognitively complex task of using information for some 
purposes but not for others (e.g., using a criminal record as an indicator of 
credibility but not propensity).184 In the case of evidence that falls into this 
 
178  See Dennis J. Devine et al., Jury Decision Making: 45 Years of Empirical Research on 
Deliberating Groups, 7 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 622, 666 (2001) (“In general, limiting instructions 
have proven to be ineffective and have even been associated with a paradoxical increase in the targeted 
behavior.”). 
179  See, e.g., Roselle L. Wissler & Michael J. Saks, On the Inefficacy of Limiting Instructions: When 
Jurors Use Prior Conviction Evidence to Decide on Guilt, 9 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 37, 43 (1985); see 
also Theodore Eisenberg & Valerie P. Hans, Taking a Stand on Taking the Stand: The Effect of a Prior 
Criminal Record on the Decision to Testify and on Trial Outcomes, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 1353 (2009) 
(finding a statistically significant impact of a prior criminal record on the likelihood of conviction, 
especially in cases with weak overall evidence). 
180  538 U.S. 408, 422 (2003). 
181  Justice Ginsburg discussed the difficulty in making this distinction in her dissent in Philip 
Morris USA v. Williams, 549 U.S. 346, 362 (2007) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
182  We know of no study that has tested judicial reactions to limiting instructions, but there is 
evidence that judges do in fact show the human tendency to use information they are aware they should 
disregard. See, e.g., Wistrich et al., supra note 175, at 1323‒24. 
183  See Diamond & Vidmar, supra note 105, at 1914; Samuel R. Gross, Make-Believe: The Rules 
Excluding Evidence of Character and Liability Insurance, 49 HASTINGS L.J. 843, 859–60 (1998); 
Kassin & Sommers, supra note 175, at 1047‒49. 
184  Joel D. Lieberman & Jamie Arndt, Understanding the Limits of Limiting Instructions: Social 
Psychological Explanations for the Failures of Instructions to Disregard Pretrial Publicity and Other 
Inadmissible Evidence, 6 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 677, 685 (2000) (pretrial publicity); see also 
Devine et al., supra note 178, at 666. 
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single-use category, the only realistic way to prevent the decisionmaker 
from using the information for impermissible purposes would be to bar the 
evidence entirely. 
It is worth noting that limiting instructions may be relatively rare in the 
typical civil case. We saw such limiting instructions in only two of our 
cases, both of which involved plaintiffs with criminal records. In designing 
a remedy for misuse of limiting instructions, it would first be valuable to 
know when and how often they are used. 
VI. CONCLUSIONS, CHALLENGES, AND RADICAL REFORM 
The conventional wisdom on jury comprehension of legal instructions 
is only partially correct: juries do struggle with jury instructions, and they 
sometimes misapply legal rules in reaching their verdicts.185 With some 
important exceptions, however, the deliberations of the Arizona jurors as 
they discussed legal issues were remarkably consistent with the instructions 
they received. Moreover, the evidence presented here shows that 
deliberations do assist in resolving individual misunderstandings. The jurors 
in Arizona, armed with individual copies of the jury instructions, were able 
to correct nearly half of the errors made during their deliberations. 
Nonetheless, a substantial portion of the struggle jurors go through in 
attempting to apply unnecessarily convoluted and ambiguously worded 
instructions is preventable. The push to improve the clarity of jury 
instructions is well-justified. But it is not enough if we are serious about 
having jurors apply the law. 
Other procedures, typically within the judge’s discretion but not widely 
used and used in just a few of the Arizona cases, may also improve 
comprehension. For example, the judge may give substantive legal 
instructions at the beginning of the trial that can assist jurors by giving them 
a preview of the legal issues they will be asked to deal with.186 Similarly, by 
giving final legal instructions before closing arguments, the judge can 
provide the complete legal framework so that the attorneys can then refer to 
the legal instructions that the jurors have already heard from the judge, and 
the jurors can then place those arguments in the appropriate legal context. 
Yet, as we have seen, the more challenging obstacles to optimal jury 
 
185  We note, however, that application of the law by judges in state civil bench trials, at least in the 
eyes of appellate courts, shows an imperfect record: a 27.5% reversal rate (the reversal rate for jury trials 
is 33.7%). Theodore Eisenberg & Michael Heise, Plaintiphobia in State Courts? An Empirical Study of 
State Court Trials on Appeal, 38 J. LEGAL STUD. 121, 130 (2009). 
186  E.g., Amiram Elwork et al., Juridic Decisions: In Ignorance of the Law or in Light of It?, 1 LAW 
& HUM. BEHAV. 163, 172 (1977); Saxton, supra note 20, at 112; Vicki L. Smith, Impact of Pretrial 
Instruction on Jurors’ Information Processing and Decision Making, 76 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 220 
(1991); see AM. BAR ASS’N, supra note 29, at princ. 6.C.1, at 29 (“The court should give preliminary 
instructions directly following empanelment of the jury that explain . . . the basic relevant legal 
principles, including the elements of the charges and claims and definitions of unfamiliar legal terms.”). 
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performance in dealing with the law arise in those areas of 
“misunderstanding” that stem not merely from heavy legalese or poor 
sentence structure, but from deeper structural issues and failures to confront 
inconsistencies and ambiguities in the law. The Arizona deliberations, 
although generally showing sensible decisionmaking by citizens motivated 
to “get it right,” reveal tensions arising from some fundamental gaps 
between what we tell jurors to do and what we want them to do, coupled 
with limitations on what we can reasonably expect from any human 
decisionmaker, whether judge or jury. Even a wholesale conversion to plain 
English instructions would not eliminate these tensions. The honest 
assessment is that we can do better than to supply juries with a “kettleful of 
law.”187 We can add structures that guide them in using an unfamiliar recipe, 
rather than simply tossing a set of ingredients in a pot. We can conduct 
empirical tests to gauge whether the ingredients and seasonings are 
blending well.188 We can directly tell jurors to avoid ingredients that will 
spoil the stew. Those improvements will take more work, but they can be 
made. 
If we are really serious about educating trial jurors about the law they 
are to apply, we could take an even more radical step: recognizing that 
instruction is more effective when it is not one-sided. Modern courts are 
increasingly permitting jurors to submit questions for witnesses during trial. 
The questions are vetted by the judge with advice from the attorneys before 
the witness is permitted to answer them. The evidence is that the 
opportunity to submit questions offers useful assistance to jurors.189 When it 
comes to jury instructions on the law, however, the only point at which a 
jury can submit a question is after their deliberations begin. As in other 
states,190 in all of the Arizona Jury Project cases, the bailiff informed the 
jury at the beginning of deliberations that if they had a question, they 
should write it down, have the foreperson sign it, and ring for the bailiff, 
who would then deliver the question to the judge. That means that the jurors 
must confer and submit any question they may have on the law to the bailiff 
or marshal. The judge then must contact the attorneys, who are not likely to 
have remained in the courtroom, to discuss the answer the jury will 
 
187  See BOK, supra note 2 and accompanying text. 
188  See, e.g., Diamond & Levi, supra note 33. 
189  See SEC v. Koenig, 557 F.3d 736, 741‒43 (7th Cir. 2009); Shari Seidman Diamond et al., Juror 
Questions During Trial: A Window into Juror Thinking, 59 VAND. L. REV. 1927, 1942‒44 (2006) 
(providing an empirical evaluation of the practice). 
190  See, e.g., MICH. SUPREME COURT COMM. ON MODEL CIVIL JURY INSTRUCTIONS, 1 MICHIGAN 
MODEL CIVIL JURY INSTRUCTIONS No. 60.01, at 60-5 to -6 (2002 & Supp. 2011) [hereinafter MICH. 
MODEL CIVIL INSTRUCTIONS], available at courts.mi.gov/mcji/MCJI.htm; Bailiff Orientation—
Interaction with Jurors, WASH. COURTS, http://www.courts.wa.gov/training/global_printversion/Bailiff_
PrintVersion.htm#manjurdurdel (last visited Sept. 4, 2012) (including instructions for bailiffs on how to 
manage jurors during deliberation). 
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receive.191 The jurors learn quickly that they cannot receive an immediate 
response to a question they submit during deliberations.192 This may 
discourage questions, and it hardly facilitates understanding. An alternative 
would be to read the instructions in the courtroom, providing each juror 
with a copy as the instructions are read, and immediately to take any 
questions a juror has at that point. As with questions for witnesses, such 
questions should be submitted in writing, and as with questions submitted 
during deliberations, the judge should consult with the attorneys before 
responding. Of course, some questions may emerge only as deliberations 
unfold, but others may be clear from the start. Judges might prefer to avoid 
taking the chance they may give a legally inaccurate answer that will 
become an argument on appeal, as can happen with a legally inaccurate 
response to a question submitted during deliberations, but the benefit is that 
misunderstandings can be corrected that would otherwise follow the jury 
into the deliberation room. 
A final option for responding to some of the inconsistencies we have 
observed between legal standards and juror preferences is even more 
radical: we can use what we have learned from the jury’s discomfort (and 
modest resistance) in applying aspects of the law to reconsider what the law 
should be. The historical record on the jury’s potential role here is 
instructive. Early juries deciding felony cases reportedly often refused to 
convict because so many felonies (i.e., approximately 230 capital felonies 
in the early nineteenth century, up from about 50 a century earlier) were 
punishable by death, a sentence that seemed unduly harsh in many of these 
cases.193 The unwillingness of jurors to convict offenders guilty of these less 
serious offenses that were punishable only by death reportedly led to 
elimination of the death penalty for those offenses.194 
In the twentieth century, the jury played a role in modifying legal 
doctrine in civil cases. The traditional law of contributory negligence barred 
plaintiffs from any recovery if the plaintiff bore any responsibility for his 
injury. Jurors allegedly refused to apply this rule strictly, awarding damages 
even when the plaintiff was partially at fault and leading the way to the 
modern comparative negligence approach that recognizes divided 
responsibility.195 Perhaps it is time to listen to the jury again in assessing the 
 
191  See, e.g., MICH. MODEL CIVIL INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 190. 
192  See VICTOR VILLASEÑOR, JURY: THE PEOPLE VS. JUAN CORONA (1997), for an extreme instance 
of the discouragement jurors felt in waiting to have a question answered. The jurors in the Arizona Jury 
Project waited up to forty-nine minutes for a response (the mean was nineteen minutes; the median was 
twenty minutes). 
193  See KALVEN & ZEISEL, supra note 24, at 310‒11. 
194  Id. 
195  Stephen C. Yeazell, The New Jury and the Ancient Jury Conflict, 1990 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 87, 
113‒14. 
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role that insurance and litigation costs should play in compensating injured 
plaintiffs. 
 
 
